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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

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MAUREEN K. DEAN and      :
JOHN W. DEAN,            :
                          :
                Plaintiffs, :
                          :
                v.         :
                          :
                ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC., : No. 92-1807
                LEN COLODNY, ROBERT GETTLIN, : (HHG) (AK)
                G. GORDON LIDDY, and         :
                PHILLIP MACKIN BAILLEY,     :
                          :
                Defendants.                 :
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Washington, D.C.

Friday, December 6, 1996

Videotape Deposition of

G. GORDON LIDDY

a witness, called for examination by counsel
for the Defendant pursuant to notice and
agreement of counsel, beginning at
approximately 1:08 p.m. at Collier, Shannon,
Rill & Scott, 3050 K Street, N.W., Washington,
D.C., before Joanne Liverani, notary public in
and for the District of Columbia, when were
present on behalf of the respective parties:

1 APPEARANCES:

2 On behalf of Plaintiffs (Via Telephone):

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4 ANDREW DOTY, ESQUIRE
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9 On behalf of Defendant, ST. MARTIN'S PRESS:

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15 On behalf of Defendant, LEN COLODNY:

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21 On behalf of Defendant, G. GORDON LIDDY:

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P R O C E E D I N G S

VIDEOGRAPHER: Good afternoon. We are rejoining the record for G. Gordon Liddy's in the Dean v. St. Martin's Press case.

Today's date is December 6, 1996, and the time indicated on the video screen is 1:08 p.m.

Will the witness please be resworn by Joanne Liverani, the court reporter for Beta Reporting.

Whereupon,

G. GORDON LIDDY

was called as the witness and, having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT,

G. GORDON LIDDY

BY MR. WILLIAMS:

Q This is the continuation of Mr. Liddy's deposition. We have already had four days of the deposition, on July 4, 5, 6 and 7, 1996. Present today is counsel, myself, John Williams and Kerrie Hook, Collier,

1 Shannon, Rill and Scott, representing
2 Mr. Liddy.

3 Also present is Benton Becker
4 representing Len Colodny; Brad Ellis
5 representing St. Martin's Press; Raighne
6 Delaney representing Phillip Bailey.

7 The only party not represented today
8 from the defense side is Stewart Pierson, who
9 represents Bob Gettlin. Mr. Pierson was
10 informed of the deposition today, but was
11 unable to attend, and may attend, we don't
12 know.

13 Also participating by speaker phone
14 today is, as I understand it, John Garrick,
15 representing John Dean, along with his
16 colleague Andrew Doty, D-o-t-y; is that
17 correct?

18 MR. GARRICK: Yes.

19 MR. WILLIAMS: Did I miss anybody?

20 MR. GARRICK: Not from this end.

21 MR. WILLIAMS: Okay, great. Why
22 don't we get started; is that acceptable,

1 Mr. Garrick?

2 MR. GARRICK: Yes.

3 MR. WILLIAMS: And the state of the
4 record is Mr. Garrick had questioned Mr. Liddy
5 for four days. He may have some additional
6 questions. We are going to, by consent, go
7 ahead today with our redirect examination. And
8 I understand that Mr. Dorsen may attend
9 tomorrow and ask some additional questions; is
10 that right?

11 MR. GARRICK: That's correct.

12 MR. WILLIAMS: And everybody reserves
13 every right they have with respect to
14 subsequent questioning of Mr. Liddy. Why don't
15 we start?

16 MR. GARRICK: Right.

17 BY MR. WILLIAMS:

18 Q Good afternoon, Mr. Liddy.

19 A Good afternoon, sir.

20 Q Welcome back.

21 A Thank you.

22 Q Mr. Liddy, I would like to cover some

1 areas that have not been covered yet in your
2 deposition, and let me start by focusing upon
3 your education and background.

4 And could you just describe briefly
5 where you were born, where you grew up, and a
6 bit about your educational history and your
7 background?

8 A All right. I was born on the 30th of
9 November, 1930, in Brooklyn, New York. And
10 after about two years there, of infancy, my
11 parents moved over to Hoboken, New Jersey,
12 which is just on the other side of the Hudson
13 River, and I stayed there until I was about 10
14 or 11 years old.

15 While I was in Hoboken, New Jersey, I
16 was educated through kindergarten and grammar
17 school by nuns in a Roman Catholic parochial
18 school. Then I moved to West Caldwell, New
19 Jersey, slightly before the Second World War
20 began -- for the United States, at any rate.
21 And there I completed my grammar school
22 education at St. Aloysius' Roman Catholic

1 parish school under the auspices of the
2 Dominican nuns.

3 And I then went to prep school. I
4 went to St. Benedict's preparatory school in
5 Newark, New Jersey, which was operated by the
6 Benedictine monks. And I took the Latin
7 scientific course, graduated, and entered
8 Fordham University as an undergraduate, Fordham
9 College in New York City, where I was educated
10 by the Jesuits.

11 I completed a bachelor of science
12 degree there, and immediately went into the
13 United States Army; because that was in 1952,
14 the Korean War was in progress. And I had
15 achieved a commission as a second lieutenant of
16 artillery in the United States Army via the
17 ROTC program.

18 Two years later, the war having ended
19 and I having been mustered out, in -- I entered
20 Fordham Law School in New York City. And I
21 graduated in 1957, as a member of the law
22 review, one of the editors.

1 I entered immediately the Federal
2 Bureau of Investigation, after having taken and
3 passed the New York State bar examination, and
4 been admitted to the bar of the state of New
5 York. I was in the FBI for five years. I
6 resigned from the FBI in, I think, September of
7 1963, and thereafter practiced law at Liddy,
8 Sullivan, Daniels, Farth (phonetic) and Stimple
9 (phonetic). The Liddy in that law firm name
10 not being mine but that of my father, the late
11 Sylvester J. Liddy.

12 The practice was an intellectual
13 property practice: patents, trademarks, unfair
14 competition causes. I specialized in
15 trademarks.

16 While I was doing that, I attended
17 New York University Graduate School of Law,
18 taking courses that were deemed helpful in
19 dealing with the new European -- then-new
20 European Economic Community. Some German
21 antitrust law, because that was the most
22 developed body of antitrust law in Europe at

1 the time, and similar things.

2 I left my -- the practice of law with
3 my father, and went up to Poughkeepsie, New
4 York, and became an assistant district attorney
5 of Dutchess County, New York. And under the
6 rules that obtained at that time, I was able to
7 also have a private practice in the civil
8 field, certainly nothing in the criminal field.

9 I ran in 1968 in a primary election
10 for the Republican nomination for the then-28th
11 Congressional District. I lost. And because I
12 lost only narrowly and had built my own
13 political organization, I was asked to take
14 over the campaign for the presidency of Richard
15 Nixon in that area, which I did.

16 And following the election of Richard
17 Nixon, I went down to Washington to join the
18 new administration. I arrived in Washington,
19 D.C., in I think around March of 1969. It was
20 within 90 days of Richard Nixon having been
21 inaugurated. And my first position was that of
22 special assistant to the Secretary of the

1 Treasury for organized crime. And I reported
2 through Eugene Rossides, the assistant
3 secretary for enforcement, I think it was his
4 title. I held that position until I would say
5 around 1971, when I became the enforcement
6 legislative counsel of the Treasury. And I
7 reported through Judge Pierce, who was the
8 general counsel of the Treasury at that time.

9 And about 15th of June of 1971, I
10 moved to the White House as staff assistant to
11 the President of the United States, reporting
12 to Mr. Ehrlichman, John Ehrlichman, through
13 Mr. Bud Krogh. And I was almost immediately
14 placed in a special investigations group, I
15 guess is the most accurate way to describe it,
16 that consisted of Mr. Krogh and Mr. David
17 Young, who were coequal, I guess you would say,
18 leaders thereof, and I was a member of the
19 group.

20 And subsequently a short time
21 thereafter, we were joined by E. Howard Hunt,
22 who came in under the sponsorship of

1 Mr. Colson. Mr. Hunt, I understood at that
2 time, was a consultant and/or assistant to
3 Mr. Colson.

4 Q And did you have a sponsor?

5 A My sponsor was Mr. Mitchell. The
6 occasion of my coming over to the White House
7 was the writing of a memorandum by Mr. Donald
8 Santarelli, who was associate deputy attorney
9 general, one of a number of them, in which he
10 recounted his conversation with John Mitchell
11 that I was to be moved to the White House, and
12 that Mr. Santarelli and Mr. Krogh were
13 empowered to invoke his name to do whatever was
14 necessary to get that done, get that
15 accomplished.

16 Q Okay. And what types of things did
17 you do when you got to the White House?

18 A Well --

19 Q What were your assignments?

20 A My immediate assignment was to deal
21 with those law enforcement matters such as gun
22 control, explosives control, organized crime,

1 and the kinds of things that were within the
2 purview of the Department of the Treasury, for
3 policy purposes. And then, as I say, almost
4 immediately I was sent down to this special
5 group which was located in room 16 in the Old
6 Executive Office Building. And there, the
7 overall assignment was the suppression of
8 leaks, of secrets of the administration, to the
9 press.

10 Q Did that group have a particular
11 name?

12 A I gave it the name that it had at
13 first. I gave it the acronym of ODESSA,
14 Organization Directed to Eliminate the
15 Subversion of the Secrets of the
16 Administration. It was used in what is called
17 in the clandestine business and the
18 classification of information business as a
19 "sensitivity indicator."

20 The group has since come to be called
21 historically "the plumbers"; it was never known
22 as that while I was there. It was so

1 christened by Mr. Young after the group had, in
2 fact, dissolved.

3 Q And what were some of the projects
4 that the "plumbers" worked on?

5 A The main project at the time was the
6 difficulty we were having with one Dr. Daniel
7 Ellsberg. Mr. Ellsberg was a Ph.D. who had
8 civilian service in Vietnam; I think he had
9 ones, however, been a captain in the Marine
10 Corps.

11 And because of his background and
12 education, had been one of, I understand, about
13 seven people who were detailed to prepare
14 something called the McNamara Study on the
15 Origins, History and Development of the
16 Vietnamese War, which came subsequently to
17 become known popularly as the Pentagon Papers.

18 And the Pentagon Papers, there were
19 very few copies of them. And those copies had
20 to be kept in a location that was certified for
21 top secret classified documents. And one of
22 those places so certified was the safe of the

1 Rand Corporation, R-a-n-d, which was located in
2 Santa Monica. It is a think tank which exists
3 to this day. And Dr. Ellsberg apparently was
4 employed there.

5 And according to Dr. Ellsberg, he had
6 taken one of the sets. In association with one
7 or two other people that were colleagues, he
8 had taken one of the sets of the so-called
9 Pentagon Papers, McNamara study. And according
10 to him, delivered it to The New York Times
11 newspaper.

12 And thereafter, there was a battle in
13 the courts in which the Nixon administration
14 attempted to prevent publication of the
15 document on national security grounds. The
16 Supreme Court of the United States held that
17 such a prior censorship or prohibition was not
18 permissible under the First Amendment of the
19 United States Constitution.

20 And most of what was received by The
21 New York Times from Dr. Ellsberg was published
22 by The New York Times and then subsequently

1 other newspapers, I think The Washington Post
2 was another one of the newspapers.

3 And Dr. Ellsberg was indicted by a
4 Federal grand jury in connection with these
5 activities. And the investigation by the FBI
6 was not going particularly well, and in the
7 view of the administration, neither was the
8 prosecution. And this particular group was
9 assigned to do whatever could be done to
10 assist, and one of the things that we thought
11 would be helpful -- let me back up a little
12 bit.

13 We, "we" being the group, did not
14 know whether Dr. Ellsberg was in fact what he
15 was being suggested in the press; that is, sort
16 of a romantic loner of the left acting out of
17 conscience, however misdirected. Or whether he
18 was someone who was in with the show of the KGB
19 of the Soviet Union.

20 We knew through the FBI that he had
21 taken more from the top secret holdings of Rand
22 Corporation than just the McNamara study. We

1 did not know where those documents were,
2 although we had a lead that they might be in a
3 locker of a Bekins storage warehouse in Los
4 Angeles. We did not know what he intended to
5 do with them. We had learned from the Federal
6 Bureau of Investigation which maintained, at
7 that time at least, a 24-hour, 7-day-a-week
8 surveillance of the embassy of the Soviet Union
9 on 16th Street in Washington, that someone,
10 identity unknown, had given the entire --
11 including the materials not published by The
12 New York Times, to the Soviet Union, to the
13 embassy.

14 That was a calamitous event, in our
15 view. And the reason is that the McNamara
16 study can be divided into two main parts; the
17 first, exactly what it purports to be, a
18 narrative history. In that narrative history
19 there's all sorts of excerpts from, references
20 to, citations and what have you, from top
21 secret back channel traffic and other documents
22 of the highest degree of code word sensitivity.

1 The second section, if you will, of
2 the entire document, are complete copies of all
3 of those documents which are referred to in the
4 narrative. That is so that the reader, and I
5 think there were only seven people who were
6 permitted to read it at that time, the reader
7 could refer down to the entire document, see to
8 whether the citation was accurate, whether it
9 was in context and so on.

10 Now, if you have something in the
11 clear, that was originally encrypted, then you
12 have got the Rosetta stone, because both sides
13 during the Cold War used to record everything
14 from each side, including the encrypted stuff.
15 And we feared that the Soviet Union would now
16 have the Rosetta stone.

17 And we did know what else Ellsberg
18 had or what he intended to do. We knew from
19 the FBI that Dr. Ellsberg, although he had
20 terminated the services of a psychiatrist in
21 Beverly Hills, California, whose name was
22 Fielding, was still very close to that

1 physician, and he consulted him at all hours of
2 the day and night, and discussed with him the
3 most intimate and minute details of his daily
4 life. This information from the FBI we
5 believed undoubtedly came from a wiretap,
6 although they had never said as much.

7 So we sent a lead, "we" being the
8 group, sent a lead to the FBI to obtain the
9 medical records maintained by Dr. Fielding of
10 Dr. Ellsberg, believing that something so
11 central to his life as the taking and
12 distribution of the McNamara study and the
13 additional documents he might very well have
14 discussed with his psychiatrist. He might have
15 told him whether he was involved with the KGB;
16 might have told him what else he had; he might
17 have told him what he intend to do with it;
18 might have told him he was the one that gave it
19 the Soviet Union, et cetera.

20 The FBI simply approached
21 Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist, Fielding, asked
22 for the records, and on the basis of the

1 doctor-patient relationship, was turned down.
2 And I had determined by that time that the FBI
3 was no longer conducting black bag operations,
4 surreptitious or covert entries, if you will,
5 to obtain things like that. And so we, that is
6 the group, suggested that course.

7 And a memorandum to that effect was
8 prepared, and it was sent up the line through
9 Mr. Krogh for approval or disapproval. It came
10 back approved, and so on the 3rd of September
11 1971, we, that is the group, using Cuban
12 expatriates who had been trained and had been
13 in the service of the Central Intelligence
14 Agency, penetrated the office of Dr. Fielding,
15 and they looked for those records. They were
16 not there.

17 And on the theory that because
18 perhaps they were -- it is a closed file, it
19 was not kept in the office but in the home of
20 Dr. Fielding, we did a preliminary
21 vulnerability survey of Dr. Fielding's home,
22 with the idea in mind that we would seek

1 permission to go in there. And we returned
2 back to Washington, sought that permission.
3 That permission was denied, and so that was the
4 end of that.

5 Q You mentioned the "Rosetta stone";
6 could you explain what you meant by that?

7 A Well, the Rosetta stone was a
8 marvelous archaeological find in Egypt. On one
9 tablet, there were writings of the same
10 material in I believe three different ancient
11 languages, one of which at least was already
12 known, decipherable. And that enabled
13 archaeologists to decipher the other languages.

14 Q You mentioned that the receipt by the
15 KGB of these documents was a "calamitous
16 event"; why is that? Why was it so
17 significant?

18 A Because they would, in our opinion,
19 because they had top secret sensitive code word
20 SPECAT material; that means separately
21 compartmented intelligence. They would then be
22 able to decrypt, if you will, massive amounts

1 of materials that they had previously recorded,
2 just encrypted and of no use to them.

3 Q What effect could that have, if any,
4 upon national security?

5 A Well, it would have been a disaster,
6 in my view.

7 Q Why?

8 A Because they could have read all our
9 top secret back channel traffic, had access to
10 our SPECAT material, and so on.

11 Q Could you describe any more of the
12 activities of the ODESSA group during that
13 period of time you were there?

14 A Well, prior to our attempting on the
15 3rd of September of '71 to obtain the records
16 of Dr. Fielding, we had tried to get a handle
17 on Fielding's motivations and what have you by
18 seeking the assistance of psychiatrists who
19 were staff members at the Central Intelligence
20 Agency.

21 And two of them came over, one of
22 them, a name I recall was Malloy, a Dr. Malloy.

1 And we had given them our holdings, which did
2 not really amount to much more than the
3 newspaper clippings and some stuff from the
4 FBI. They had prepared a psychological
5 evaluation; we didn't think much of it, and
6 they said, "Well, you know, garbage in, garbage
7 out. You give us better material, we will be
8 able to" -- and that was another thing we
9 intended to do with the medical records if we
10 could get them.

11 We studied, as best we could, the
12 leaks that the administration was complaining
13 of, trying to figure out who would have had
14 access to the material and who the leaker could
15 have been.

16 There were peripheral things going
17 on. Bud Krogh had assignments from
18 Mr. Ehrlichman that had nothing to do with the
19 operations of the group, that he was doing.
20 David Young was involved with the selections of
21 candidates to be, possibly, nominated by the
22 president to the Supreme Court of the United

1 States and other high-level judicial
2 appointments.

3 Q Who was Jack Caulfield?

4 A Jack Caulfield was a former member of
5 the intelligence division of the New York City
6 Police Department, who had originally been
7 working for John Ehrlichman when John
8 Ehrlichman held the position of counsel to the
9 President, and who was inherited by John Dean
10 when John Dean took that position, upon the
11 elevation of Mr. Ehrlichman to head of the
12 Domestic Council.

13 He acted as an investigator, trouble
14 shooter, gatherer of information on a sort of
15 off-the-books basis. If there was something
16 that was desired that it was not thought
17 appropriate to task the FBI or the CIA,
18 Mr. Caulfield and the man working through him,
19 Mr. Anthony Ulasewicz, were given the task.

20 An example of that would be the
21 sending of Mr. Ulasewicz up to Chappaquiddick
22 to try to get information about the death of

1 Mary Jo Kopechne.

2 Q All right. What the operation they
3 had in New York City with Xaviera Hollander;
4 was that another example?

5 A Well, it was thought, apparently,
6 desirable or possibly helpful if the "trick
7 book," which is criminal jargon for the list of
8 clients, if you will, of the prostitution ring
9 operated by Xaviera Hollander over on East 55th
10 Street in New York City. She became
11 subsequently known in the press as the
12 so-called "Happy Hooker," quote unquote.

13 And Mr. Caulfield was successful --
14 whether or not that was through Mr. Ulasewicz,
15 I don't recall -- in obtaining that list. And
16 Mr. Caulfield confided to me that it was
17 useless, because there were as many
18 Democrats -- Republicans on it as there were
19 Democrats, and there was sort of a balance of
20 terror there. So nobody wanted that thing to
21 be made public.

22 Q All right. Now, when did you first

1 meet John Dean?

2 A I probably first met and said hello
3 to him at a meeting that was held in the
4 Department of Justice, when Mr. Dean was one of
5 I think four associate deputy attorneys
6 general. Donald Santarelli was one; Walter
7 Johnson was one; John Dean was one; and there
8 was another chap who I recall subsequently
9 became a judge, whose name escapes me now.

10 And shortly after I arrived in the
11 spring of '69, and I joined the Nixon
12 administration. And bear in mind that the
13 Department of Treasury has some law enforcement
14 responsibilities. They have supervision over
15 the operations of the United States Secret
16 Service, which, in addition to protection of
17 the President, has jurisdiction over
18 counterfeiting -- the crime of counterfeiting
19 of U.S. currency; of the investigation service
20 of the United States Customs Service. So in
21 any event -- and also the Bureau of Alcohol,
22 Tobacco and Firearms.

1 There was to be a big meeting of the
2 people who were now in place from the new
3 administration having to do with law
4 enforcement. And it was under the sponsorship
5 of the Attorney General, and it was held over
6 in Justice. And in attendance were the United
7 States attorneys, and at that time, there
8 existed something called "Strike Forces," which
9 was sort of a parallel organization to the
10 United States attorneys, and they were rivals,
11 and there was a lot of often bad blood between
12 them. And Strike Force attorneys were there.

13 Those persons in the department who
14 had to do with law enforcement were there. I
15 was there representing the turf, if you will,
16 of the Treasury. And that's probably where I
17 was introduced to and said, "Hello, how are
18 you," to Mr. Dean, although I don't have a
19 specific recollection of that.

20 Mr. Dean subsequently moved over to
21 the White House.

22 Q All right. Did there come a time

1 when you had any subsequent contact with him or
2 heard of Mr. Dean?

3 A Yes. Let's see.

4 Both Mr. Dean and I were tasked, for
5 some reason, with giving recommendations as to
6 what should we do with respect to an invitation
7 to the President to attend a function at the
8 Kennedy Center. Leonard Bernstein, then alive,
9 had written a mass, a classical form of music
10 is a Latin mass. And he was going to debut the
11 mass at the Kennedy Center. And the president
12 had been invited.

13 And there was concern that
14 Mr. Bernstein's mass would have a very
15 peacenik, if you will, left-wing bias, and that
16 that could possibly embarrass the President of
17 the United States. Mr. Dean worked on that,
18 and I worked on that, and I think we both came
19 to the same conclusion, that it was a bad idea
20 for the President to go and the President did
21 not attend.

22 The 1972 convention of the Republican

1 party was originally scheduled to be held where
2 this last one was held, the convention center
3 in San Diego, which was then still under
4 construction. I was tasked to go out and look
5 at that. And there was -- there was a
6 controversy. ITT Corporation, as I recall, had
7 offered to pay \$400,000 towards the convention
8 expenses, and there was an antitrust case, I
9 think, at the time going on with respect to
10 ITT. And both Mr. Dean and I were involved,
11 again, for some reason, in making a
12 recommendation as to whether or not that money
13 should be accepted or not.

14 And both of us agreed that although
15 there probably was not any kind of a quid pro
16 quo offered or expected, that the appearance
17 was so bad that we should turn down the
18 \$400,000.

19 I went further and said that, not
20 having anything to do with ITT, that the site
21 as it then existed was indefensible with regard
22 to the proclaimed mobs that were going to come

1 down and cause a lot of trouble, whereas, had
2 we had it in Miami Beach, all you have to do is
3 cut off the causeways and you effectively sever
4 access to a mob. It is surrounded by water.
5 So I said we ought to move the whole thing to
6 Miami. Let's see --

7 Q Well, did there come a time when John
8 Dean or anybody on his behalf asked if you
9 would be interested in a different type of job?

10 A Well, yes. I would say somewhere
11 around maybe around the 1st of November of
12 1971 --

13 MR. GARRICK: John, if I could
14 interrupt for just a second.

15 Mr. Liddy, that last answer, we
16 missed it. It cut out for some reason.

17 THE WITNESS: At what point did you
18 stop receiving?

19 MR. GARRICK: The last question John
20 asked, we didn't hear any of your answer.

21 MR. WILLIAMS: Let's start again.
22 The question was, did there come a time when

1 you were approached by John Dean or anybody on
2 his behalf, for another job.

3 THE WITNESS: Did you get that?

4 MR. GARRICK: Yes, thank you. That's
5 where you cut out.

6 THE WITNESS: All right.

7 Around the 1st of November of 1971, I
8 was summoned up to the office of Bud Krogh.
9 And when I got there he said, "John Dean wants
10 to pitch you on something." And he said, "I
11 would like to be there when he does."

12 And I said, "Well, you know, I work
13 for you, and you have every right to be there.
14 And besides," I said, "with John Dean, it is
15 always good to have a witness present." And he
16 said, "Well, he is going to be here in a few
17 minutes." And sure enough, in a couple of
18 minutes, John Dean arrived, came in, said hello
19 and sat down.

20 And he said, "It may be necessary for
21 you and Jack," referring to Jack Caulfield, "to
22 go into the closet for a while." And I said,

1 "Why?" And he said that we were facing a
2 difficult election coming up in 1972, that we
3 had a taste that summer of what we could
4 expect next year by -- in terms of mobs,
5 demonstrations and that sort of thing, and it
6 was necessary that we have an excellent
7 intelligence capability to deal with that.

8 And I had been shown previously, by
9 Mr. Caulfield, a document outlining an
10 offensive and defensive intelligence operation
11 that went by the code name Sandwedge. And it
12 was a -- budgeted at half a million dollars and
13 it included covert entries, black bag jobs,
14 electronic surveillance and so on.

15 So I said -- I mean, that's what
16 popped into my mind. I said, "You mean
17 Sandwedge?" He said, "No, we will need
18 something much more complete, much more
19 sophisticated and better than that." And I
20 said, "Well, if you are -- if you are thinking
21 of what I think you are thinking of, an all-out
22 offensive and defensive capability," I mean he

1 just offered me, you know, the -- for openers,
2 the half-million dollar budget there.

3 Q Who offered you?

4 A Wait a minute. When I was -- what I
5 said is if you -- "If you are talking about
6 what I think you are, all-out capability,
7 offensive, defensive, covert entries,
8 electronic surveillance, the whole nine yards,
9 it is going to be very expensive." So he said,
10 "How about half million for openers?"

11 Q Who said that?

12 A Dean said that. And what he was
13 doing was offering me the whole budget of
14 Sandwedge for openers. And I said, "Well,
15 that's about right. Because by the time you
16 get finished with this thing, it is going to be
17 about double that, a million dollars." I said,
18 "Is that going to be a problem for you?"

19 And he said, "No. A million dollars
20 is going to be okay."

21 And so then he said, "You can't do it
22 from here," meaning the White House, which is

1 where I was at the time. Krogh said, "No,
2 that's right. You can't do it from here. You
3 are going to need some cover." And I said,
4 "Well, okay. But I am too high-profile, you
5 know, to go into the closet. I can't just
6 disappear. It would cause too much comment. I
7 need a cover."

8 And I said, now -- and I addressed
9 this to both of them. I said, "Bud, I am here
10 because of John Mitchell, and I'm working for
11 Ehrlichman. There's a number of different ways
12 that I could be of assistance to the President
13 in the campaign of 1972, and I want to be sure
14 that both of those men agree that this way is
15 the best way, the way they want me to carry on,
16 go forward."

17 So I said, "You, Bud, I would like to
18 you take this up with Ehrlichman; and you,
19 John, I want you to check with Mr. Mitchell."
20 And Dean said, "Fair enough." And out he went.

21 Q Okay. Before we go on, you indicated
22 in your initial discussion on this matter with

1 Bud Krogh, you said something to the effect
2 that it is always good to have a witness with
3 Dean; do you recall that?

4 A Yes, yes, I do.

5 Q Why did you say that to Bud Krogh?

6 A Because of an evaluation of Mr. Dean
7 that had been given to me by Mr. Santarelli.
8 Donald Santarelli said that his association
9 with Mr. Dean went back to when they were both
10 what he called "Hill rats," quote unquote. The
11 meaning of that means being staffers up on
12 Capitol Hill, either in the House or the
13 Senate.

14 And apparently, he and Wally Johnson
15 and John Dean and I guess maybe this other
16 fellow who became a judge, who had all
17 apparently become associate deputies attorney
18 general, had previously been aides up on the
19 Hill and he had known Dean back then.

20 And he said, "Dean is an idea thief."
21 And I said, "Well, what do you mean?" He said,
22 "Well, if we are all working up there, and

1 you've got an idea for some policy or thing
2 that you think should be done, and you are
3 typing away, and it is lunchtime. We all go to
4 lunch, Dean won't go. He'll stay behind, and
5 he'll read what's in everybody's typewriter.
6 And if he likes the idea that is in there, he
7 will then run to his, prepare and complete the
8 memorandum, put his name on it and submit it
9 before you are back from lunch.

10 "He is an idea thief. He is not
11 trustworthy at all, and you should not have
12 anything to do with him."

13 And that was the genesis, if you
14 will, of my remark that I would want a witness
15 present to do anything with John Dean.

16 Q All right. Now, after this meeting
17 with Bud Krogh and John Dean, who did you speak
18 with next?

19 A I went down and saw Howard Hunt, my
20 colleague with the special investigations
21 group. And I said, you know, "You will never
22 guess what happened. John Dean pitched me on

1 this, and they want a full, all-out offensive
2 and defensive capability," and so on and the so
3 forth. And he said, "Well, you know, things
4 like that are" -- and I solicited his
5 assistance. And I said, "I also hope that we
6 could have the assistance of the Cuban Cohort.

7 Q What is the Cuban Cohort?

8 A These are the fellows whom we used in
9 the Fielding entry.

10 Q Why did you ask Mr. Hunt about the
11 Cuban Cohort?

12 A Well, because E. Howard Hunt, when he
13 was employed by the Central Intelligence
14 Agency, had been heavily involved at a very
15 high level with the Bay of Pigs invasion. He
16 had been associated with the 2506 Brigade,
17 which were Cuban expatriates trained by the
18 Central Intelligence Agency to invade Cuba. He
19 was a person whom they revered, under the code
20 name Eduardo.

21 And that is where we got the
22 assistance. He was able to go down and

1 reestablish his connection with those people.
2 In working with them I saw that they held him
3 in the highest regard. They had all been
4 trained by the CIA, and Hunt had access to
5 their training files, and so on.

6 And at any rate, he said, "Well, you
7 know, you are talking about a lot of money."
8 And I said, "They offered me half a million for
9 openers." He said, "That's right in the
10 ballpark. This is a million-dollar operation
11 would be about right."

12 And he said yes, he would -- he would
13 be willing to help me with that. And he kidded
14 me about it, because we had not had much money
15 to use, for equipment or anything else for that
16 matter, in the Fielding operation, and so we
17 had acquired Radio Shack transceivers.

18 And we had had a lot of problems with
19 the Radio Shack transceivers. A lot of time we
20 would be trying to talk to each other, and we
21 were getting taxicab guys and everything. He
22 referred to them as the Mickey Mouse radios,

1 and he said, "Okay, no Mickey Mouse radios,
2 right?" I said, "That's right." We would be
3 able to get good Motorola stuff and do it
4 right.

5 MR. WILLIAMS: We have been going for
6 a while. If it is all right with you,
7 Mr. Garrick, why don't we take a three- or
8 four-minute break; is that all right?

9 MR. GARRICK: Do you want to call us
10 back?

11 MR. WILLIAMS: No, why don't you hang
12 on the phone and we will put you on hold.

13 MR. GARRICK: Okay.

14 VIDEOGRAPHER: Going off the record
15 at 1:56 p.m.

16 (Recess)

17 VIDEOGRAPHER: Returning to video
18 record. It is now 2:10 p.m.

19 BY MR. WILLIAMS:

20 Q All right, Mr. Liddy. We were just
21 through the first meeting with Mr. Dean, and my
22 question is this: Were you surprised at all

1 that it was Mr. Dean who asked you to get
2 involved in this intelligence operation?

3 A No. The reason is that, if you
4 recall, he made reference to the demonstrations
5 that we had that summer and so on. John Dean
6 was the clearinghouse, if you will, for all the
7 agencies of the government, all the law
8 enforcement agencies, including the police and
9 everybody else that were pouring information
10 into Washington from their informants about
11 these activities.

12 John Dean ran the clearinghouse. And
13 his reputation was good for that. Purportedly
14 he did a good job at that, and that was his
15 area of responsibility. And so it did not
16 surprise me at all that he was recruiting me
17 for intelligence operations.

18 Q Okay. We're beyond the first meeting
19 with Dean and Mr. Krogh and any subsequent
20 meeting with Howard Hunt.

21 Can you describe the next time you
22 had any contact relating to a possible new job?

1 A Well, within one or maybe two weeks,
2 after the meeting that I have just been talking
3 to you about between Mr. Krogh, Mr. Dean and
4 myself, I was again summoned up to see
5 Mr. Krogh. And when I got into his office, he
6 said, "How would you like to be the general
7 counsel of the 1972 campaign, of the Committee
8 to Re-elect the President?"

9 And that immediately meant to me,
10 there is my cover; that's the cover job. And I
11 said, "Yes, that would be fine. I would like
12 to do that." And he said, "Well," he said,
13 "they need help over there on election laws and
14 things like that, and you would be right there
15 to do all the intelligence stuff," and that fit
16 right in.

17 And I said, "Now, have you checked
18 with or run this by Ehrlichman and Mitchell?"
19 And he said, "Yes, and they agree." I said,
20 "Okay, that's fine."

21 And he said, "By the way," he said,
22 "I'm sorry that I haven't been able to pay you

1 what you are worth over here," and what have
2 you, and he said, "You really ought to take
3 advantage of this, to the extent that, you
4 know, get what you should be getting." He
5 said, "If I were you I would not go over
6 there," meaning to the Committee to Re-elect
7 the President, which was over at 1701
8 Pennsylvania Avenue, catercorner from the Old
9 Executive Office Building, "for anything less
10 than \$30,000."

11 And I thought that was good advice.
12 And I went down to tell David Young, who was,
13 remember, coequal with -- in that group down
14 there, with Mr. Krogh. And David Young said,
15 "Listen, don't go over there until this matter
16 of your title and compensation are settled,
17 because if you do you will have no bargaining
18 power. You will have no leverage." And I
19 figured, well, David Young came from the office
20 of Dr. Kissinger, who was the world's greatest
21 negotiator, that would be good advice.

22 So Krogh had said, you know, "You

1 ought to see Mitchell about this, and you ought
2 to check with Dean." So I saw Dean, and Dean
3 said, "Do you know Magruder?" And I said, "No,
4 I don't know Magruder." And he said, "Well, he
5 is sitting in for Mitchell over there, and you
6 need to meet him."

7 Q When you say "over there," what do
8 you mean?

9 A Meaning at 1701 -- the Committee to
10 Re-elect the President.

11 Q Why do you call it 1701?

12 A That's the address. "The Committee
13 to Re-elect the President offices" is a whole
14 mouthful, and we all used to just refer to it
15 as 1701.

16 So he arranged to take me over there,
17 and introduce me to Mr. Magruder.

18 Q This is Mr. Dean?

19 A Mr. Dean. Mr. Dean did that. And so
20 we went over, and right away Dean objected to
21 my being called the general counsel. He said,
22 "We're -- we don't have any titles over here.

1 We are not supposed to have any titles over
2 here." And I discussed my salary. I chose the
3 lower of the two, Mr. Krogh said \$30 and
4 Mr. young said \$40,000, and I went for the \$30.
5 And he said, "Well, Mr. Haldeman has a rule.
6 No one is to make any money on the campaign."

7 And what that meant was, whatever you
8 were getting from where you came, White House
9 or what have you, that was it. You get the
10 same amount of money; you wouldn't make any
11 money. I said, "Well, that's fine, but I don't
12 want to continue losing money, and I am not
13 coming over here, you know, for anything less."
14 Well, that was kind of -- left on sort of a
15 sour note there, I guess. And --

16 Q Who is this discussion with now?

17 A Well, that discussion, in Mr. Dean's
18 presence, was with Mr. Magruder. And so at any
19 rate, it was obvious I wasn't getting along
20 very well with Mr. Magruder.

21 And Mr. Dean arranged a meeting with
22 Mr. Mitchell without Mr. Magruder being

1 present, and I prepared an agenda for the
2 meeting.

3 Q Now had you been hired at this point?

4 A No, because the matter was still up
5 in the air of my salary and compensation and
6 what have you. This was to enlist the aid of
7 my sponsor, Mr. Mitchell, who also, by the way,
8 happened to be the sponsor of John Dean. So we
9 had that in common.

10 So Mr. Dean arranged a meeting with
11 Mr. Mitchell, and I prepared an agenda. That
12 included intelligence matters and it included
13 the various aspects of legal work that would be
14 in my area of responsibility and so forth, but
15 the first thing I had on there was organization
16 and chain of command.

17 And so Mr. Dean and I went over and
18 we met on, I think it was the 27th of November,
19 with Mr. Mitchell, in his office, inner office.
20 And we discussed the legal matters, and we
21 discussed the organization chain of command.
22 As a matter of fact, Mr. Mitchell said it

1 hadn't been decided yet as to who was going to
2 be the chairman of the campaign, if you will,
3 but he said, "It will probably be me." He
4 didn't look terribly happy about that.

5 We never got to anything having to do
6 with intelligence at all. But Mr. Mitchell,
7 who I assumed had been primed by John Dean as
8 to my concerns before I would go over there, he
9 brought up title and salary. And he agreed
10 that we need the title of general counsel and
11 that I should get the salary of \$30,000.

12 But it appeared that the salary
13 matter -- well, certainly, Mr. Mitchell could
14 make a determination on title, the salary, that
15 was in the ambience, if you will, of
16 Mr. Haldeman.

17 At any rate, I went back and I would
18 receive calls saying, "When are you coming
19 over?" And I would say -- you know, calls from
20 Mr. Magruder. And I would say, "Well, when I
21 get this matter straightened out." And finally
22 I was told that Haldeman had relented and I was

1 going to get the \$30,000, I already had from
2 Mr. Mitchell the title. And so I went over, I
3 went over, I think, around the 6th of December
4 of 1971, and became the general counsel.

5 Q What sort of duties did you have?

6 A Well, I had two duties, one of which
7 was not supposed to be known to anybody else,
8 but unfortunately was announced in an incorrect
9 way by Mr. Magruder. He called a staff
10 meeting, leader of the troops in, and he said,
11 "Here is G. Gordon Liddy. He is your new
12 general counsel, and he is going to be helping
13 us on these election laws and things like that,
14 and he is in charge of dirty tricks."

15 And I just really got very, very
16 angry and annoyed, and afterwards chewed him
17 out for that. Nobody had a need to know, and
18 in the first place, "dirty tricks" was not
19 really what I was going to be in charge of.
20 That's a completely different thing.

21 So that -- things were just going
22 from bad to worse with Magruder, let's put it

1 that way.

2 Q All right. Now, did you have another
3 meeting with John Mitchell?

4 A Well, yes. I was told, you know,
5 Mr. Dean thought that I should start preparing
6 for my intelligence duties. And in my
7 conversation with Mr. Magruder, I said, you
8 know, "We got a lead time here, and I need
9 money to organize." And as far as I was
10 concerned the half million had already been
11 authorized, and I needed something to draw on.

12 And he said, "Well, half a million
13 dollars is -- or a million dollars is a
14 tremendous amount of money, and you had
15 better -- for money we have to have a flow
16 chart." Magruder was really into flow charts.
17 The flow chart did not come from Dean. But the
18 presentation to Mr. Mitchell was Dean's idea.

19 In any event, I got together with
20 Mr. Hunt and we drew up our plans, and we had
21 rough little charts and things that we made to
22 help us draw up a TO&E, table of organizations

1 and equipment, and so forth, and of course, the
2 flow chart that we had to have.

3 And I am not good at that; nor, in
4 terms of artistic merit, is Mr. Hunt. And I
5 said, you know, "I can't go over here with
6 stuff to the Attorney General with stuff like
7 this, to show him how I am going to do what he
8 wants and what he is retaining me for." And
9 Hunt said, "That's not a problem. He would
10 have the CIA do it."

11 And lo and behold, he took those
12 whole things and he gave them to somebody or
13 other. And then at a point in time he said --
14 which was prior to the next meeting, which was
15 the 4th of February, I think. He said, "Go
16 down," he said, "give this -- there is a guy
17 going to be coming across the street on the
18 corner. He is going to have a package with
19 him, big package. You give him, from
20 operational funds, \$200 or \$300, he will give
21 you the package. You don't have to talk to
22 him," you know, all that clandestine

1 hugger-mugger.

2 And I ended up with this big
3 three-by-four package, which turned out to be
4 beautifully, professionally prepared charts.

5 So --

6 Q Is this before the first meeting?

7 A Before the second meeting that I had
8 with Mr. Mitchell, the first meeting at which
9 in attendance, besides myself, was Messrs. Dean
10 and Magruder and Mitchell.

11 Q This was the meeting of January 27;
12 is that right?

13 A Yes, January 27, right. Because the
14 first meeting was in -- when was the first
15 meeting? Wait a minute.

16 I went over there on the 6th of June,
17 and then I went over fairly soon to see -- with
18 Mr. Dean to see Mr. Mitchell. I am getting
19 bollocksed up on the dates now.

20 Q All right.

21 A It is in my book. I can refresh my
22 recollection.

1 MR. WILLIAMS: Why don't you take a
2 look at your book?

3 MR. BECKER: My notes reflect the
4 witness said on November 27th --

5 THE WITNESS: The first meeting was
6 the 24th. The first meeting was the 24th of
7 November.

8 BY MR. WILLIAMS:

9 Q That was before you were hired?

10 A Before I was hired.

11 MR. GARRICK: I'm sorry, John.
12 Mr. Liddy is looking at his book to refresh his
13 recollection; is that right?

14 THE WITNESS: Yes. I am looking
15 at -- right now, because the page was turned
16 and was handy, I am looking at my -- actually
17 it's Ms. Hook's copy of the paperback edition,
18 that is -- let's see, it is dated July 1991.
19 This is not the new one, which is in the
20 bookstores as we speak, because I didn't -- I
21 have the new one here, but I don't have it
22 all -- I don't have these pages all turned

1 here.

2 MR. WILLIAMS: John, in fairness,
3 what we will do is, he has not referred to his
4 book yet. He did it for the purpose of this
5 date. And certainly the video, if it is
6 important to you whether he is looking at his
7 book or not, the video will pick that up.

8 THE WITNESS: I am holding -- here,
9 there's two books. This is the one that I
10 looked at, and this is the new bible on
11 Watergate, Dean and everything else, right
12 here, with the whole new postscript.

13 MR. GARRICK: All right. No plugs
14 now.

15 MR. WILLIAMS: All right.

16 (Laughter)

17 MR. BECKER: Mr. Williams, can I ask?
18 Mr. Liddy said the first meeting was November
19 24, and I'm not sure. What meeting is he
20 talking about, with whom?

21 THE WITNESS: The first meeting, the
22 November 24 meeting was just Mr. Dean and I and

1 Mr. Mitchell, in Mr. Mitchell's office. The
2 second meeting, the 27 January meeting, that
3 was Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Dean, Mr. Magruder and
4 me. And that's the one to which I brought the
5 charts, having previously said I would like to
6 have a stand made available.

7 BY MR. WILLIAMS:

8 Q Now we are on the meeting of January
9 27, 1972. Why don't you go through what
10 happened at that meeting?

11 A Okay. That meeting, I -- you know,
12 set up the stand, put all the charts on there,
13 they were in order. And I proceeded to give to
14 everybody in the room a presentation of the
15 all-out offensive and defensive capability,
16 intelligence capability, and organization that
17 Mr. Hunt and I had devised.

18 We had the overall umbrella term
19 "Gemstone" was what we gave it. And then the
20 component parts thereof were broken down into
21 the names of particular gemstones: diamond,
22 emerald, pearl, opal, et cetera. And then when

1 you had so many different things, that we went
2 from precious gems to semi-precious gems till
3 finally we were down to brick and coal
4 (laughter). That's how much stuff we had
5 there.

6 And as I would give this, the
7 Attorney General would just sit there, and he
8 had his pipe and he would puff on his pipe, and
9 he would nod. And from time to time he would
10 make what I would characterize as a sardonic
11 comment. For example, we were going to -- one
12 operation was to abduct the leaders of these
13 demonstrations. The left had put out a call
14 and said, "Everybody come to the convention."
15 They still had not moved the convention; it was
16 very vulnerable there.

17 And they had been sending out
18 booklets and diagrams, how to make destructive
19 devices and all the rest, to use in the attack.
20 And I had adopted the Texas Ranger approach to
21 a riot: one riot, one Ranger, because they
22 would just wait until they were out on the

1 periphery of the crowd until they could isolate
2 who was the leader, and the guy would go in and
3 take out the leader. And a leaderless mob was
4 much more easy to disperse.

5 Well, we were going to take out the
6 leaders. We were going to abduct them, take
7 them down to Mexico, and hold them there until
8 after the festivities were over, bring them
9 back, turn them loose. And I said, "We've got
10 really serious people who can do this. We've
11 got people who amongst them have killed 22
12 people, include two -- including two who had
13 been hanged from a beam in the garage, I was
14 given to understand."

15 Mitchell said, in -- "Just where do
16 you find people like that?" I said, "I
17 understand they are from members of organized
18 crime." And he said, "How much will this cost
19 us?" And I said, "Well, skilled professionals
20 at anything, they are expensive."

21 And he said, "Well, let us not
22 contribute any more than we have to to the

1 coffers of organized crime." That was the kind
2 of conversation that was going on with
3 Mitchell. Magruder and Dean were not saying
4 anything. They were of no help whatsoever.

5 And so in any event, when the
6 presentation was all over, John Mitchell
7 started, you know, stuffing his pipe full of
8 tobacco again, the way he would do. And he
9 said, "Well, Gordon, a million dollars is a lot
10 of money. And I think, you know, you better go
11 back and redo this. This is a lot of money."
12 And he said, "Take those charts and burn them,
13 and do it personally."

14 And I was chagrined. I mean, here I
15 was, doing what I had been told by John Dean
16 was wanted by the Attorney General, and I
17 thought that Mr. Hunt and I had done a pretty
18 good damn job of it. And we had been offered
19 the million dollars, and he is telling me that
20 it is too much money.

21 So as soon as the meeting was over I
22 started chewing on Dean and Magruder. I said,

1 you know, "You guys were no help at all. I am
2 over here by myself. I don't even know why I
3 am in a position of selling something to
4 somebody who has already ordered it, and you
5 don't say anything. You don't give me any
6 support."

7 And they said, "Well, you have to
8 understand John Mitchell. You don't understand
9 John Mitchell. We really know John Mitchell.
10 And that is a lot of money, a million dollars
11 is a lot of money, and maybe collections
12 haven't been that good or whatever." And Dean
13 said, "Well, yes," he said, "maybe something
14 not so broad-gauged as what you have."

15 And Magruder said, "Cut it in half;
16 try half a million dollars. That was what the
17 initial offer was, the half million dollars,
18 Maybe they've got a half million dollars and
19 that won't be a problem, so try a half million
20 dollars."

21 And on that note, you know, we
22 dispersed and I went to see Hunt. And I told

1 him what had happened, and we were both
2 discouraged, but we decided that we could do
3 it. Because there were some elements in there
4 that were very high-cost elements; for example,
5 a chase plane. That's expensive. So what we
6 did was we sat down and we tried to take out
7 the real high-dollar items, keep as much as we
8 could, and keep half a million dollars.

9 And we were successful, I think, in
10 doing that, and inasmuch as I had been told, in
11 no uncertain terms, to burn the charts, clearly
12 they didn't want those big charts any more,
13 Mr. Mitchell didn't. But we had to have
14 Mr. Magruder's damn flow chart, of course, and
15 the other thing.

16 So I prepared new charts which were
17 just the size of a standard piece of typewriter
18 paper. And that was easily done with, you
19 know, with a pencil and ruler and what have
20 you. But when it came to the flow chart,
21 again, not having any artistic ability, I
22 turned to my wife who has an extraordinary

1 amount of artistic ability and just had her do
2 the flow chart, which looks something like a
3 ski jump. She didn't know what it was for and
4 I didn't tell her. She had no need to know.

5 And so when we had the next meeting,
6 which was on the 4th of February, I think,
7 again, it was myself, Magruder, Dean and
8 Mitchell.

9 Now, Dean was delayed. So we went in
10 and -- I mean, I didn't want to keep the
11 attorney general waiting. So I distributed my
12 new charts, these things that were the size of
13 a piece of paper, and I told the attorney
14 general we have been successful in eliminating
15 high-dollar items, such as the chase plane and
16 so on and so forth.

17 And at that point, before I started
18 again to say what would be in the new -- you
19 know, the \$500,000 organization, Dean entered
20 and he took his seat. And he was there for the
21 full presentation of what survived the cut,
22 which was -- let's see, it included the covert

1 entries; it included electronic surveillance;
2 it included the abduction; it included the use
3 of the prostitutes to gather information and so
4 on.

5 And at the end of this presentation,
6 John Mitchell was totally noncommittal. He
7 just said, "Well, I'll have to think about it."
8 And again, no help from Dean and Magruder.

9 And it was my full intention to chew
10 on both of them yet again, but Dean scurried
11 out of there before I could get ahold of him,
12 and so my full attentions went to Magruder.
13 And Magruder was, "Oh, well, now, you know how
14 Mitchell is, I know how he is, it is still too
15 much money." And make a long story short, I
16 was to cut it in half yet again, down to a
17 quarter of a million dollars.

18 Q Who told you to do that?

19 A Magruder.

20 Q Before that happened, back when the
21 meeting is still occurring, did Dean say
22 anything about how a decision of this --

1 A Oh, okay. Yes.

2 Q -- would occur?

3 A What happened was, when it was
4 finished and Mr. Mitchell said, "I am going to
5 have to think about it," Dean interjected, and
6 he said, "I don't think a decision on a matter
7 like this should come from this office." And I
8 took that to mean that he wanted some back
9 channel to get the decision to him or something
10 of that sort. Okay, more hugger-mugger.

11 In any event, he got out of there. I
12 couldn't yell at him; so I did at Magruder.
13 And, you know, cut it in half.

14 And so Hunt and I came up with a
15 \$250,000 budget. And this time, because
16 Magruder was going to have to approve the funds
17 and so forth, I worked with Magruder on the
18 thing. And that was fine. He had the plan, he
19 knew what it was and he promised he would get
20 me a decision from Mr. Mitchell.

21 And we didn't get any decision. I
22 mean, we were getting no decision, no decision,

1 no decision, and Hunt was really upset. He
2 said, "Look, we've got all these people on the
3 line and we are not giving the decision. This
4 does not inspire confidence," and so on and so
5 forth.

6 So I decided that we would make use
7 of one of what I considered to be Mr. Hunt's
8 assets, his big gun. His big gun was Chuck
9 Colson. So Hunt arranged a meeting between the
10 three of us; that is, Mr. Hunt, myself, and
11 Mr. Colson. But he let me take the lead on it.

12 So when we went into Mr. Colson's
13 office, I went right up front in front of
14 Mr. Colson's desk. Hunt sat in the rear of the
15 room. And I started to try to tell Mr. Colson
16 what we needed a decision on, and he just cut
17 me off right away. He did not want to hear any
18 details of anything. He said, "Look, all you
19 need, Gordon, is a decision; is that right?"
20 "Yes." He said, "Okay."

21 That's it. He didn't want to hear
22 any details. And he picked up the phone; he

1 got ahold of Magruder, wherever Magruder was.
2 I think Magruder was down with John Mitchell,
3 in Key Biscayne somewhere. And he said, "Liddy
4 is here," and he said, "he can't get a decision
5 from you people, and he needs a decision. Get
6 him a decision." And that was that. It was
7 very quick, and we were out of there.

8 Colson didn't know -- want to have
9 any information on it. And sure enough --

10 Q Let me stop you for a minute. You
11 have revised the plan by this time down to --

12 A Oh, yes. Down to a quarter of a
13 million.

14 Q Down to a quarter of a million?

15 A Right.

16 Q And can you tell us what some of the
17 elements were in that revised-down plan?

18 A Covert entries, electronic
19 surveillance, the implantation of people if
20 possible, spies, if you will, into the other
21 side. I think the prostitutes survived. We
22 were going to sabotage the air conditioning

1 units. That wouldn't have cost very much money
2 just to -- you know, some emery in the gears
3 and things of that sort. But the main thing
4 was the surreptitious entries and the
5 electronic surveillance.

6 Q Were those actually drafted up and
7 typed up in any form?

8 A Yes, we had -- we had a plan, and we
9 had certain things we were going to do. And we
10 had funds for two optional, what I would call
11 targets of opportunity, and you just -- we
12 would get a great opportunity to get some
13 information on something, and we could do that.

14 Q What were the targets on the plan?

15 A Well, there was the McGovern
16 headquarters, was certainly one of the targets.
17 The operations down in Miami during the
18 Democratic convention. They had survived the
19 cut. You know, electronic, prostitutes, the
20 things -- the --

21 Q Was the DNC headquarters and the
22 Watergate on that list?

1 A No.

2 Q And why not?

3 A Well, in the first place, the
4 Democrats had still not even chosen their
5 candidate. And it is true that McGovern was
6 perceived to be in the lead, but it was always
7 our suspicion that if ever he said, "I want
8 it," that Senator Edward Kennedy, Teddy
9 Kennedy, because he was the sole surviving son,
10 could have just said, "I want it," and he would
11 have gotten it by virtue of that alone. And he
12 would have been a much, we thought, more potent
13 candidate. And who knows where he would have
14 set up business and all the rest of it.

15 So Brian and those people were not,
16 so far as we knew, in the DNC. The DNC could
17 have been become a good target if -- after the
18 Democrats had selected their candidate from
19 amongst those who were in contention. Now
20 remember where those who were in contention
21 are. You've got Muskie; he has got a few rooms
22 in some building up in one place. And we have

1 got McGovern down there on Capitol Hill, and
2 he's got himself a little headquarters there.

3 But once the guy becomes the
4 candidate, he could say, if he wanted to, "I
5 would like the DNC headquarters; move in
6 there." He can have anything he wants. Well,
7 maybe then, but certainly not now, and we
8 didn't know whether he would do that or not.
9 So it wasn't on there.

10 Q Okay. So you are waiting for a
11 decision.

12 Let me ask this question: Was the
13 DNC ever on any list of prior plans?

14 A No.

15 Q Now, you are focusing on your
16 attention to the period of March of 1972; you
17 still did not have a decision?

18 A We still didn't have a decision, but
19 I didn't think the thing was dead yet. Hunt
20 kept thinking it was dead, and I said, "No,
21 there's kind of little indications that it is
22 not dead."

1 They had me doing ad hoc things; one
2 of the things that they asked us to do, and we
3 used the Cuban Cohort was, this is an example.
4 There was an allegation that the Democrats were
5 running a scam, if you will, down in Miami, in
6 connection with their convention. Kickback
7 scheme, I think is what it was supposed to be.
8 And they said, "Investigate this, find out, you
9 know, is there a kickback scheme?" And so on
10 and so forth.

11 We sent somebody in there on a
12 pretext, wearing a wire, to see if he would be
13 asked for a kickback and so on and so forth.
14 And I had a memorandum around the 15th of
15 March, that I drew up, reporting on all of this
16 investigation, the same way you do in the FBI,
17 for Mr. Mitchell. And I sent it forward to
18 Mr. Mitchell. When I got it back, it said
19 "need more information," but that was from
20 Mr. Dean.

21 Q What was from Mr. Dean?

22 A The memo that I sent to Mr. Mitchell

1 came back with the annotation "need more
2 information" on it, initialed by John Dean.

3 So --

4 Q And what did that mean to you?

5 A What that meant to me was that Dean
6 was still running -- he was the overall
7 intelligence guy, although I had thought that I
8 was supposed to be it. I guess I was the
9 operational guy, but Dean was still the boss.

10 MR. WILLIAMS: Let me just put that
11 into the record. What is our next exhibit
12 number?

13 MS. HOOK: That has been previously
14 marked, I believe, in Mr. Dean's deposition as
15 an exhibit.

16 MR. WILLIAMS: All right, let's
17 just -- what is on there?

18 VIDEOGRAPHER: The next number is
19 No. 654.

20 (Liddy Deposition Exhibit
21 No. 654 was marked for
22 identification.)

1 MR. WILLIAMS: Let me just mark
2 Exhibit No. 654. Mr. Garrick, this is the memo
3 March 15, 1972; are you familiar with that one?

4 MR. GARRICK: Yes.

5 MR. WILLIAMS: I thought so. Okay.

6 Let me just show to it Mr. Liddy and
7 ask if that is indeed the memorandum that he
8 was referring to.

9 THE WITNESS: Yes. Yes, it is. The
10 second page is where the notation by Mr. Dean
11 appears.

12 BY MR. WILLIAMS:

13 Q Okay. Thank you.

14 Now, did there come a time when you
15 were advised that there had been an approval of
16 your project?

17 A Yes. On or about the 1st of April,
18 Mr. Robert Riesner, who is an aide, was an aide
19 to Mr. Magruder. Magruder was, I guess, still
20 down in Key Biscayne or wherever.

21 Mr. Riesner came to me and said,
22 "You've got a go on your project; you've got a

1 go," in other words, on the project, which I
2 took to mean that I had the approval. And I
3 was delighted to know that.

4 Q And was money appropriated for your
5 projects?

6 A Yes. You've got to remember that on
7 or about 27th of March, I went downstairs.
8 Now, what do I mean by "downstairs"? The
9 Committee to Re-elect the President was on one
10 of the upper floors of the building that we
11 referred to as 1701. A couple of floors below
12 that was the Finance Committee to Re-elect the
13 President, which was under the chairmanship of
14 Mr. Maurice Stans, and the treasurer thereof
15 was a man named Hugh Sloan.

16 And Hugh Sloan had been seeking my
17 assistance on legal matters. They had a big
18 problem coming up. There was a brand-new
19 campaign finance law that would kick in on the
20 7th of April. And the significance of that is
21 that any cash or other moneys that they took in
22 prior to the 7th of April, they did not have to

1 identify as to source, because the old law
2 applied.

3 And an awful lot of heavyweight
4 contributors, people like Dwayne Andreas of --
5 you know, that outfit that is always calling
6 itself America's Grocer or whatever it is.

7 Q ADM?

8 A Yes, ADM. They give to both parties,
9 and they don't want the other party to know how
10 much they are giving to this party, because
11 they are liable to say, "Hey, you gave \$12 to
12 the Republicans and you only gave \$10 to the
13 Democrats. How about another \$2?" They don't
14 want to hear that.

15 So that was coming up. And he had a
16 lot of legal questions, and I would help him
17 out. I was having an awful time with Magruder.

18 Q Why?

19 A Because Magruder is just an
20 all-around general pain in the ass, and
21 Magruder was not a lawyer. And I would prepare
22 legal memoranda which were designed to address

1 legal concerns, and to be read by other lawyers
2 who would understand them. You would, for
3 example, understand it; Mr. Garrick would
4 understand it.

5 Mr. Magruder would not understand it;
6 he didn't have the education to understand it.
7 And he would then start to whine and snivel and
8 cry about how he couldn't understand it. And I
9 would have to write it, you know, "See Dick and
10 Jane," so that he could understand it. And I
11 was unwilling to do that.

12 And on one occasion, he came up to
13 me, I can remember it very well, in the
14 elevator lobby. He is taller than I, and he
15 leaned on my shoulder and started to wince and
16 snivel and carry on about how he couldn't
17 understand my latest memorandum and I would
18 have to redo it.

19 And I said, "Jeb, if you don't take
20 your arm off my shoulder, I will tear it off
21 and beat to you death with it." Whereupon he
22 ran away and told everybody that I had just

1 threatened to kill him. Technically I guess he
2 was correct. The man can't take a joke.

3 At any rate, that was what I mean.
4 It was just an intolerable situation. So I
5 talked to Hugh Sloan, and I said, "Look, you
6 have got -- you are giving me more and more and
7 more work here." And I cut a deal with Hugh
8 Sloan so that I came down on the 27th of March
9 and became the general counsel of the Finance
10 Committee to Re-elect the President.

11 Q Now, with respect to your
12 relationship with Mr. Magruder, did John Dean
13 ever intervene at all to try to patch together
14 that relationship, to your knowledge?

15 A He invoked Mr. LaRue. Now Fred LaRue
16 was understood to be John Mitchell's eyes and
17 ears in the committee, and his trouble shooter.
18 And we were summoned, "we" being Mr. Magruder
19 and I, were summoned to the presence of
20 Mr. LaRue.

21 And he said that Dean had told him,
22 you know, that we weren't getting on, and this,

1 that, and the other thing. And he said that
2 both of us were losing sight of the fact that
3 the object of the exercise, if you will, was
4 the re-election of the president. And what we
5 could do, we were over there to re-elect the
6 president and not to fight amongst ourselves,
7 and so on and so forth.

8 And he sort of made us shake hands
9 and what have you, and Magruder was all upset
10 because he said I cut my own deal; I cut my own
11 deal, meaning that I was going downstairs. And
12 that didn't seem to bother Mr. LaRue. He just
13 wanted us both to -- because I wanted to stop
14 dealing completely with Magruder, and Mr. LaRue
15 said no, I would have to continue.

16 Q Okay. Now I think the question was,
17 when you started to talk about going
18 downstairs, after the money was approved for
19 the project -- excuse me, after the project was
20 approved, were you authorized some money?

21 A Yes. I was authorized, in accordance
22 with the flow chart, I think the initial sum

1 was \$83,000. And that came from Mr. Sloan, and
2 it came in cash.

3 Q And what did you do with that money?

4 A Well, I took it -- by that time, of
5 course, I had an office just very close,
6 really, to Mr. Sloan's. And I had a secretary,
7 Sally Harmony, and I had a -- one of those big
8 lockable safe file things.

9 And I got all these 8-by-10
10 envelopes, manila envelopes, and I put on the
11 outside of the envelope the name of the
12 different operations that had been approved,
13 and were scheduled in accordance with the
14 \$250,000 plan. And into each envelope I put
15 the amount of money that had been budgeted for
16 that one, and in accordance with the flow chart
17 and so forth.

18 And then if I were to have to have an
19 expenditure to -- that was in advance of
20 preparation for Opal, let us say, then that
21 money would come out of the envelope marked
22 Opal.

1 Q Do you remember what Opal was?

2 A No. Not without looking at my book
3 now. As I said, there were so many of them,
4 you know, the only -- I remember just a couple
5 of them.

6 Q With respect to the covert entries
7 that were planned, at this point in time which
8 covert entries did you have authorization on?

9 A Well, we had McGovern's headquarters,
10 and we were planning McGovern's headquarters.

11 Q Why don't you go on?

12 A Okay. I had been placed in a
13 terrible fix by this constant delay, delay,
14 delay on a decision. Two people were
15 absolutely essential: what we call a key man,
16 that is somebody who can defeat locks; and the
17 other would be what we call a wire man, who was
18 just somebody who can do the electronics. And
19 we had a key man.

20 Q And who was that?

21 A Vergilio Gonzales, who was purported
22 to me to have been ex-Battista secret police,

1 very tough guy, very competent man. So that
2 was good, and he was recruited by Mr. Hunt.
3 And I had met him and approved him.

4 We kept getting and losing
5 prospective wire guys, and I had been
6 discussing with one James McCord, M-c-C-o-r-d,
7 wire matters, because Mr. McCord, who had a
8 background as a tech in the Central
9 Intelligence Agency, meaning that he defended
10 against -- he was an expert on defending
11 against electronic surveillance for the CIA,
12 and who also had a background, as had I,
13 previously in the FBI.

14 He had been taken on by the Committee
15 to Re-elect the President to protect our
16 premises, and he was very effective in that.
17 There were four, as my recollection is, there
18 were four different attempts to break into our
19 premises, and he defeated them all.

20 In any event, he showed me just how
21 sophisticated were the countermeasures. One
22 demonstration he gave me, he showed me a chair,

1 an upholstered chair. And he said, "All right,
2 there is a bug in there. Can you find it?"
3 And I looked all around, I couldn't find
4 anything. And he then put the chair in its
5 correct position, and he put a fluoroscopic
6 plate on the seat in one corner, and then he
7 put a black box device underneath it that he
8 operated with a foot pedal remotely, and it was
9 a Roentgen generator.

10 And sure enough, there on the
11 fluoroscopic plate you could see the
12 cross-section piece, the brace of the
13 furniture, and inside that, buried in that
14 piece of wood, there it was. There was the
15 bug.

16 And he said, "I will show you what
17 can be done." And he went and did an offensive
18 piece. He got me a transcript of a telephone
19 conversation by Mr. Strauss, who was then
20 treasurer of the DNC, speaking from his car
21 about some business matter.

22 And so, I had nobody else, and I had

1 promised that I would never use anybody from
2 the committee, because that would be traceable.
3 But I took the position any port in a storm,
4 and I recruited Mr. McCord.

5 Q Now, did you at a certain time
6 receive any instructions from Mr. Magruder with
7 respect to a new target?

8 A Yes. Mr. Magruder called me in, I am
9 trying to remember exactly when, when the date
10 of that would be. I can't remember now but it
11 was -- it was later on. And it was certainly
12 before the end of May.

13 And he said, "Could I get into the
14 DNC headquarters on Virginia Avenue Southwest?"
15 And I said, "Well, yes, I could, but what's the
16 point? They are not there." And he said,
17 well, to make a long story short, what he
18 wanted was to hear anything that was going on
19 inside the office of Larry O'Brien, who was the
20 chairman of the DNC.

21 And he also wanted to be able to
22 monitor his telephone conversations, and if

1 there was anything else lying around from -- we
2 would have photographed that, and so on.

3 Q And what was your reaction to the
4 direction?

5 A Well, I said, you know, "You are
6 going to burn one of your optional -- we are
7 really early on into this thing, and you are
8 going to burn one of your optional entries for
9 a target that I don't, you know, consider to be
10 a very good one."

11 No, this is what he wanted. And I
12 could tell that this was not Magruder's idea.
13 He was relaying instructions. So I agreed to
14 do it. And I went to Mr. Hunt, and Mr. Hunt
15 and I planned the operation. And of course it
16 included Mr. McCord, and on, I think it was the
17 26th of May, we made our first attempt to do
18 that.

19 Q Okay. We certainly want to get to
20 that. Why don't we take a couple of minute
21 break and then we will get into the first
22 break-in.

1 A Okay.

2 MR. WILLIAMS: Is that all right,
3 Mr. Garrick?

4 MR. GARRICK: Yes. Do you want to
5 put us on hold again?

6 MR. WILLIAMS: Sure.

7 MR. GARRICK: How long are we going
8 to take, five minutes?

9 MR. WILLIAMS: That's fine. Thank
10 you.

11 VIDEOGRAPHER: Going off record at
12 3:02.

13 (Recess)

14 VIDEOGRAPHER: I have returned to
15 video record. The time now is 3:18 p.m.

16 MR. GARRICK: Could I just jump in
17 for one second?

18 MR. WILLIAMS: Sure.

19 MR. GARRICK: I am just going to -- I
20 think this is how we ended. I am going to move
21 to strike Mr. Liddy's comments about knowing
22 that Mr. Magruder received the orders to break

1 into the DNC from someone else as speculation.

2 MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. Your motion is
3 denied.

4 MR. GARRICK: Good joke. That has
5 been used in this case.

6 MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, I know. But it
7 was used by me, wasn't it? Oh, no, it was used
8 by the judge, last time you said something.

9 (Laughter)

10 MR. GARRICK: You are plagiarizing
11 from the best.

12 MR. WILLIAMS: All right, let's move
13 on.

14 BY MR. WILLIAMS:

15 Q Mr. Liddy, up until the time you
16 received the order to enter the Watergate from
17 Mr. Magruder, had the notion of an illegal
18 entry into the Watergate been raised before?

19 A No. Had not.

20 Q And what was your reaction to this,
21 again?

22 A Well, twofold. First of all, I had

1 understood that I was to be the one who was to
2 choose the targets. I had been recruited by
3 Mr. Dean to organize and deploy an offensive
4 and defensive intelligence capability. I was
5 to be the guy who was choosing the targets. It
6 was now my responsibility to produce the
7 intelligence, so I would choose the targets.
8 And this was a violation of that, and I was
9 annoyed by that.

10 And secondly, it was not, in my view,
11 going to be a productive target. But it was
12 clear to me that orders had come down from on
13 high and that was it. There was nothing I
14 could do about it.

15 Q All right. Now let's get to the
16 order from Mr. Magruder. Did you execute on
17 that order?

18 A Yes. And on the 26th of May we made
19 our first of three attempts. Took three
20 attempts to get into there, because while it
21 might not look it, it is a fairly high-security
22 building. There were some Federal Reserve

1 offices in there, as I recall, and so you had
2 guards from that downstairs, and then you had
3 the building guards and so on.

4 In any event, the first plan was to
5 have the Cuban cohort pose as businessmen,
6 salespeople. And so we created an organization
7 called Ameritas, A-m-e-r-i-t-a-s, and we rented
8 a ground floor room in which to hold a business
9 dinner, supposedly. We had a camera -- a
10 projector, rather, and screen. We had a film
11 appropriate to training of business people.

12 And the object of the exercise was to
13 stay there so long that the guards would leave
14 them alone, and the alarm which led from there
15 into the office building would be disarmed by
16 Mr. McCord. And that would be how we would get
17 in.

18 Bear in mind that I was not at that
19 dinner. I was present in the area but not at
20 that dinner.

21 And everything went according to plan
22 until it came time for Mr. McCord to disarm the

1 alarm, and he was unable to do so. Meantime
2 guards had come down; it was after dark, and
3 they were sweeping the area with flashlights
4 and what have you. And to make a long story
5 short, everybody got out of there with the
6 exception of Mr. Hunt and one other, one of the
7 Cuban fellows. They were trapped in there,
8 locked in.

9 And they were concerned about the
10 periodic sweeps by the guards, so Hunt, at any
11 rate, I don't know where the other fellow -- he
12 might have hidden where Mr. Hunt did, but I
13 don't know. But they hid, and Mr. Hunt hid in
14 a liquor cabinet.

15 And he later related to me that as
16 the night wore on, and as the call of nature
17 grew more urgent and he grew more desperate, he
18 looked around and he saw a bottle of Johnny
19 Walker red label, that had only about an inch
20 or so of booze left in it, but he said that it
21 was a full bottle by the time he got out of
22 there the next day. And I have always

1 counseled people who visit the Watergate Hotel,
2 under no circumstances order Johnny Walker red
3 label.

4 At any rate, that didn't work. So
5 the next night we tried again. Different plan
6 this time. This time the locks were to be
7 picked to go in, and Mr. Gonzales failed to be
8 able to pick the lock. And I said, "What's the
9 problem? He is supposed to be an expert." And
10 he said, "Well, he is an expert, but he didn't
11 bring the right tools."

12 That really annoyed me because, you
13 know, we paid travel expenses for him. So we
14 put his expert ass on a plane and sent him
15 right back down to pick up his tools, which he
16 did and came back. And so then the third
17 night, it would be, let's see 26, 27, 28th of
18 May, using the same plan but with the correct
19 tools, he was successful in getting in.

20 Q Could you explain what the plan was?

21 A The plan was simply to go up, tape
22 the locks and -- you know, so that you would

1 have a -- an ability to retreat if you are
2 being chased. You can't very well stop to pick
3 locks, so you disable the locks, disable the
4 locks with tape.

5 And in that they are simply emulating
6 the clean-up crew, which often chooses to
7 violate the regulations to do that, simply
8 because it's too much trouble for them to keep
9 hauling out their master key and opening and
10 closing the things all the time, the way they
11 are supposed to.

12 And so they were successful; they got
13 in. And so far as I understood, they did what
14 they were supposed to do, which was to place a
15 tap on the telephone in the office of Lawrence
16 O'Brien and to place a room monitoring device
17 in the office of Lawrence O'Brien. And that is
18 what I understood that they had done.

19 And that was to be monitored from
20 across the street, in a room that had been
21 obtained in the Howard Johnson's motel.

22 Q Now, where were you when these

1 unsuccessful and later successful break-ins
2 were occurring?

3 A I stayed in the hotel. We had taken
4 hotel rooms in there and I -- that was my
5 headquarters. And --

6 Q So you were not across --

7 A No, I think I -- from time to time, I
8 would go across the street, and sometimes we
9 would get something to eat there. I am trying
10 to think exactly where I was for these things.
11 I remember vividly where I was for the one that
12 went south, which we haven't come to yet.
13 These other ones, it is not so clear to me
14 exactly where I was at what time, but I was in
15 the area.

16 Q All right. Now, who do you recall
17 was involved in the first successful break-in?

18 A Howard Hunt.

19 Q Did Hunt actually enter --

20 A No, we sent in the -- we sent in the
21 Cuban fellows and --

22 Q Was McCord --

1 A Yes, McCord was the guy who was doing
2 the wire work. And so, in each instance McCord
3 would be sent in. Mr. Gonzales was certainly
4 involved because he was the key man, and then
5 one or more of the others. It would change
6 from time to time, which of the other Cuban
7 cohort would be used in which assignment.

8 Q Now, after the first successful
9 break-in on May 28 --

10 A Yes.

11 Q Were you given Polaroid photographs?

12 A Yes. There were Polaroid photographs
13 taken of the interior, some documents, things
14 of that sort.

15 Q Okay. And what did you do with those
16 documents?

17 A Those were -- those were delivered to
18 I believe Mr. Magruder. This was commissioned
19 by or through Mr. Magruder.

20 Q Now, was it your understanding that
21 they had also placed a wiretap on the phone of
22 Larry O'Brien?

1 A Yes. There were two things they were
2 to do. One was the telephone of Larry O'Brien,
3 wiretap, and the other was a room monitoring
4 device of Larry O'Brien's office.

5 Q Where was the listening post?

6 A The listening post was across
7 Virginia Avenue Southwest, in a room in the
8 Howard Johnson's motel.

9 Q And did you have occasion to visit
10 that room?

11 A Yes. Mr. McCord brought me there to
12 see the setup, so to speak. It was after dark.
13 I had with me my black leather briefcase in
14 which the Walter Luftpistole was stored. It
15 was that pistol that I had used -- was to use
16 to shoot out the lights of the headquarters
17 outside -- or outside the headquarters of
18 Mr. McGovern.

19 In any event, I had that with me.
20 And I was sort of monosyllabically introduced
21 to a man who turned out to be Mr. Baldwin, who
22 was seated there and was observing. There was

1 a camera mounted on a tripod with a telephoto
2 lens. It was pointed in the direction that
3 Mr. Baldwin was observing. There was a
4 typewriter. There were the -- was a receiver.
5 And I didn't stay there very long. It was
6 dark.

7 Q Did you actually listen to any of the
8 conversations?

9 A No.

10 Q How were the conversations being
11 recorded? Or were they recorded?

12 A So far as I could tell, they were not
13 being recorded. Because I wanted them to be
14 recorded, and I asked subsequently for the
15 recordings, and I was told that they could not
16 be recorded. I asked, "Why?" And this was of
17 Mr. McCord that I asked this.

18 And he gave me a -- some technical
19 higger-mugger about how, the impedance in terms
20 of ohms did not match. And I said, "You know,
21 all you have to do is just take a microphone
22 and put it in front of the speaker. That

1 shouldn't be too difficult to do." Oh, well,
2 he couldn't do that.

3 And here we had a receiver that cost,
4 in 1972 money, \$8,000. It was so sophisticated
5 that it had a cathode ray to a CRT, so that you
6 could even find the signal, because the signal
7 was very weak and very -- very finely tuned.
8 And after you found the signal through the
9 oscilloscope, you then used a band spreader to
10 make the thing audible, legible.

11 And then it was from that that they
12 gathered whatever it is that was being fed to
13 it by the room monitoring device and/or the
14 telephone bug.

15 Q To your knowledge, were they able to
16 intercept telephone calls made on the phone of
17 Lawrence O'Brien?

18 A I don't believe it was Lawrence
19 O'Brien's telephone, and the reason I say that
20 now and said that then, was that there was no
21 call ever purportedly from Lawrence O'Brien or
22 by Lawrence O'Brien.

1 I wasn't getting any tapes, nor was I
2 getting transcriptions of anything. I was
3 getting logs. A log is a running commentary,
4 if you will, by whoever is monitoring the
5 device, as to what is -- he is hearing, you
6 know, when it was said and the gist of what is
7 being said.

8 And the stuff was just of no use at
9 all. It was stuff like hairdressing
10 appointments and somebody going to take a trip
11 somewhere, and personal stuff like that. None
12 of it had anything to do with Mr. Lawrence
13 O'Brien. And it just sounded likes a bunch of
14 people using the same phone.

15 Q All right.

16 A And that doesn't seem to me to be --
17 if a bunch of people were going to use the
18 phone, they wouldn't be going to the office of
19 the boss, Larry O'Brien, and using his personal
20 phone.

21 Q Now, did you give Magruder any of the
22 logs?

1 A Not as such. These logs were so
2 badly done, misspellings and all the rest of
3 it, that I felt compelled to edit them. And I
4 did that through my secretary, Ms. Harmony, and
5 I tried to clean them up a little bit and leave
6 out the worst of it, try to include the best of
7 it, which wasn't very much. And yes, I did.

8 Q And what is it that you gave
9 Magruder?

10 A I would give him a sealed envelope,
11 and we had a -- I had a sensitivity indicator
12 on there, "Gemstone," I think it said, "No --
13 no distribution, no dis," and what have you.
14 And it was -- you know, he had commissioned the
15 thing, and pretty soon I started getting
16 complaints from more than Mr. Magruder. It was
17 obvious Mr. Magruder wasn't the only person who
18 was getting these things.

19 I got called over to the White House
20 by Mr. Gordon Strachan, who was on the staff of
21 Mr. Haldeman, and he was telling me that they
22 were inadequate. Magruder, of course, was

1 telling me they were inadequate. I couldn't
2 argue with him. They were inadequate.

3 MR. WILLIAMS: All right. Let's go
4 off the record for a moment.

5 VIDEOGRAPHER: Off record, 3:35 p.m.

6 (Discussion off the record)

7 VIDEOGRAPHER: Back on the record at
8 4:09 p.m.

9 BY MR. WILLIAMS:

10 Q All right, Mr. Liddy, I think we were
11 up to your discussions with Mr. Magruder, with
12 respect to the results of the first break-in.

13 A Yes.

14 Q Now, did you receive any further
15 instructions from Mr. Magruder after the first
16 successful break-in?

17 A Well, yes. Now bear in mind that, as
18 I mentioned, everybody was in agreement that
19 the product was essentially valueless. And I
20 spoke to Mr. McCord about this, and I said,
21 "Where is the product of the room monitoring
22 device?" And he said that the room monitoring

1 device either was defective, or had
2 inadvertently been placed on a wall behind
3 which was concealed a massive steel support
4 beam, which would absorb all of the small
5 amount of RF energy that the FM transmitter was
6 putting out.

7 And so I said, "Well, we are just
8 going to have to make it right, and, you know,
9 it needs to be repaired, it is no good and what
10 have you."

11 In any event, on the 12th of June,
12 Mr. Magruder had called me in, and once again
13 complained about the thing. I said, "Well,
14 look, we can go in there and fix it. And we
15 can do it on a skeleton crew basis, just
16 Magruder -- just McCord and lock guy and maybe
17 one other person, because that apparently is,
18 according to McCord, what is wrong."

19 Or, "That is what is wrong." I
20 didn't name McCord. I didn't want him to know
21 that. So at any rate, he said, "Look" --

22 Q This is who now?

1 A "He" being Magruder. He said, "This
2 is what I want." And he took his left hand and
3 he slammed his lower left-hand drawer with his
4 desk, and that was the drawer where, whenever
5 he would give me some of these ad hoc
6 assignments that he had been giving me about
7 the Democrats, where he would pull out anything
8 of a derogatory nature having to do with the
9 Democrats that he had.

10 Which meant to me that what he wanted
11 was the -- whatever there would be of a
12 derogatory nature about us that the Democrats
13 might have, that Mr. -- what's the fellow's
14 name, the DNC guy -- O'Brien might have against
15 us.

16 And then he said, you know, "What is
17 the status of the files in there? Are they
18 locked?" Yes, they are. And he said, "Can you
19 unlock them?" I said, "Yes, we can." And so
20 then he said that he wanted us to photograph
21 everything in there, all the files. And so
22 what was to have been a quick, five-minute

1 in-and-out repair mission, the skeleton crew,
2 of minimal expense, is suddenly translated into
3 a massive photo recon op that would take hours.
4 And that's what he wanted.

5 So that's when I went back to Hunt,
6 and Hunt was upset. He said, "My god," he
7 said, "do you know how much trouble it took us
8 to get in there in the first place? All those
9 three entries," and this, that and the other
10 thing, "and now this? With all these cameras
11 and all this film and all this exposure, I
12 mean, the longer you are in there the more
13 vulnerable you are."

14 I said, "Howard, that's what's
15 wanted, so we have to do it."

16 So we set up to do that. And we
17 decided that we would use the same method that
18 had proven eventually successful the last time,
19 which is, tape the locks and, you know, pick
20 the lock of the door and go in that way. And
21 that was set up so as -- to try to minimize the
22 expense -- to coincide on the same weekend that

1 we were going to do the McGovern entry. And
2 this one was going to be on Friday night, and
3 the next one would be, McGovern would be
4 Saturday.

5 And so we set up to go in, and I was
6 with -- Hunt, this time, and I were in the
7 hotel, in the hotel room, where we had set up
8 the antennae, et cetera, so that we could be in
9 contact with these people, be inside. And with
10 the -- Baldwin across the way in the Howard
11 Johnson's hotel.

12 And we were delayed in going in
13 there, because McCord reported to us that there
14 was an individual still working. It may have
15 been Friday night, but he was still working
16 late way in the back.

17 Q Before we get into the last break-in,
18 I would like to ask just a couple of questions.

19 After your meeting with Magruder when
20 he instructed you to go back in, did you
21 subsequently have a meeting with Strachan?

22 A Yes; that was the same day.

1 Q Can you tell us about that meeting?

2 A All right. I was told to go over to
3 see Mr. Strachan in the White House, and I did.
4 And Strachan was objecting about the
5 uselessness of the product, and the -- it was
6 quite clear to me that he had had access to it.
7 And so I told him what McCord had said to me,
8 not of course using Mr. McCord's name.

9 I said that there appeared to be a
10 problem with the room monitoring device. It
11 had either failed, or signal being absorbed by
12 the beam, and gave him that whole discussion.
13 And told him that we were going to go back in
14 and fix it, and that I expected that the
15 product would improve materially.

16 Q Okay. Now about this time did you
17 also have a meeting with Mitchell?

18 A Yes. There was another meeting with
19 Mr. Mitchell. It concerned different matters.
20 And I had some of the product which I had
21 edited, and I put it into the sensitivity
22 indicator envelope and then put that into a

1 totally neutral envelope. You couldn't tell
2 anything from the outside; it was brown.

3 And I went down to attend the
4 meeting, and I decided to take my losing tricks
5 first. I said, "This is for you, Colonel," and
6 I put it in the corner of his desk. He didn't
7 touch it; just left it there.

8 And I explained that -- that we had
9 had some problems and so on, and then I thought
10 to liven things up a little bit, by telling him
11 something that I thought he might find amusing,
12 that we were going to do to the Democrats down
13 there in Miami Beach.

14 By this time, the decision had been
15 taken to move the Republican convention from
16 San Diego, where I had objected to having it in
17 the first place, to Miami Beach, which I had
18 suggested. So I said we were going to get a
19 bunch of ragged, dirty-looking guys all dressed
20 like hippies, and they were going to go up to a
21 function in Mr. McGovern's suite, with signs
22 indicating that they supported McGovern and his

1 cause. And in the presence of everybody there,
2 at some embarrassing moment, they would all
3 unzip their flies and urinate on the carpet.

4 And everybody laughed except
5 Mr. Mitchell. And he said, "Goddamnit, Liddy,
6 that's the same suite that just a couple of
7 weeks later I am going to be using." And he
8 said, "They will never get that stink out of
9 the carpet. Don't you dare do that."

10 So after the meeting I went to Hunt
11 and the told him he would have to call off our
12 operation, which we had christened "Pissers for
13 McGovern."

14 Q Now, during this meeting, did John
15 Mitchell look at the fruits of the wiretap?

16 A No. No, he didn't. I put it on his
17 desk and left it in the corner, and I saw never
18 saw him touch it.

19 Q Did he ever discuss with you any of
20 the fruits of the wiretaps?

21 Let me ask this question: Did he
22 reprimand you in any way?

1 MR. GARRICK: Excuse me for a second.
2 Did we get an answer to that last question?
3 Because we didn't hear it.

4 MR. WILLIAMS: No, we didn't. That's
5 why I am rephrasing.

6 MR. GARRICK: All right.

7 THE WITNESS: No, I was not
8 reprimanded by Mr. Mitchell for anything. I
9 have subsequently learned that he said he
10 should have thrown me out the window of his
11 office or something like that, but he never
12 made any such -- gave any such indication to me
13 at the time.

14 BY MR. WILLIAMS:

15 Q All right. Okay, now, you started to
16 testify before about the last break-in, and I
17 think you got as far as indicating where you
18 were located that evening; is that correct?

19 A Yes, I was in the hotel room. There
20 were actually two hotel rooms that we had taken
21 because of the size of the group. And Mr. Hunt
22 and I were in the one with all the electronic

1 equipment that Mr. McCord had brought in.

2 And we had to wait and wait and wait
3 because it was somebody there, and then word
4 came finally that it was clear, this fellow had
5 left. And let's see. They had gone up,
6 actually gone -- and they went up to go in, and
7 had taped the locks, and got up there, and
8 found that the -- it was wrong, the guy was
9 still there.

10 So we had to come back, and we came
11 back and regrouped. And it was reported that
12 the locks which had been taped by Mr. McCord, I
13 think, had been untaped. And I took the
14 position, "Well, that is not as alarming as it
15 might seem, because it probably was, let's say,
16 the guard who untaped them." The -- we had
17 established that that was done from time to
18 time by the clean-up crew, and he would just
19 chastise the clean-up crew for that, and would
20 not call the police.

21 And in fact that's what happened. He
22 did not call the police then.

1 There was other speculation. McCord
2 said, "Well, it might not have been that." He
3 said there were some mail bags down there and
4 maybe it was the mail people. But in any
5 event, we held a council of war, so to speak.
6 And the Cubans, they said, "Look, whatever the
7 decision is, we are up for it."

8 Q Where is this council of war
9 occurring?

10 A This was in that -- the room that
11 Mr. Hunt and I had been in, the one with all
12 the equipment that Mr. McCord had.

13 And McCord, he was for doing it.
14 Hunt was very, very loath at first, but at any
15 rate the decision was left up to me, because I
16 was the operational chief. And I said, "Okay,
17 we will go again." And they went again. And
18 the -- they got in.

19 Hunt and I were in the room, and the
20 plan had been that we would all be able to
21 communicate; that is, Hunt and I, the entry
22 team, and the lookout across the way, using the

1 transceiver equipment that we had. We had no
2 problem whatsoever in talking to the lookout,
3 but apparently, because the gain was turned
4 down by the entry team, they couldn't hear us.

5 Q The what was turned down?

6 A The "gain," you would call it the
7 volume. The technical term is "the gain."

8 And we got -- we heard very clearly,
9 Mr. Hunt and I heard the lookout fellow say,
10 "Are any of our people dressed like hippies?"
11 And we said, "No, they all have business
12 suits." And he said, "Well, there's some
13 people on a floor above, and they are going
14 along." And all of a sudden he said, "Uh-oh,
15 guns. They've got guns."

16 So we knew there was trouble, and we
17 tried to raise the entry team inside the DNC
18 headquarters.

19 Q Could you see the --

20 A No, we were blind where we were. We
21 had a window but we didn't look out on anything
22 that would be helpful. "We" being Mr. Hunt and

1 myself.

2 And we couldn't raise them, and we
3 kept saying, "Are you reading this," meaning
4 the transmissions from the look out. And then
5 finally, we got a whispered transmission from
6 the entry team and all it said was, "They got
7 us." And we knew that this thing had -- had
8 really gone bad.

9 So what we did was, we gathered up as
10 much of the equipment as we could, Hunt I
11 recall specifically taking the antenna and
12 putting it down his trouser leg, which gave him
13 a rather stiff-leg walk. And we had as much of
14 that stuff as we could carry without attracting
15 attention, and the two of us just went down and
16 exited the building, and the place was just
17 aswarm with police cars and all the rest.

18 And we just walked out of there, and
19 I got a lift from Hunt to my Jeep so that I
20 could approach it from a different direction.
21 And I went home. And Hunt went on his way.
22 And I didn't speak to him again until about

1 5:00 a.m. the next morning.

2 Q Okay. When you spoke to him the next
3 morning, what was said?

4 A He called me and he said that the men
5 were in jail and needed to be bailed out, and
6 he wanted to use the services of an attorney
7 named Douglas Caddy. And he wanted permission
8 to use the reserve fund, which I think was
9 \$8,000, to this purpose.

10 And Mr. Caddy, who had had no
11 criminal law experience, wanted to know if it
12 was okay to use another attorney known to him
13 who did have criminal law experience. And I
14 gave him permission to use the money to get the
15 guys out of there as soon as possible.

16 And then I got up and I realized that
17 we had to tell the people who are our superiors
18 that this had happened. I needed to talk to
19 Magruder, so I went to a local gasoline
20 station, a Texaco station, Bowie's it was
21 called at the time, Mr. Bowie having since been
22 murdered in a robbery. And used the pay phone,

1 and called the White House operators and was
2 told that Mr. Magruder was in California.

3 And of course it was then early in
4 the morning in California and impossible to
5 call him then. So in any event, I decided that
6 the best thing to do was to keep to my ordinary
7 habits, which was to have gone in also on a
8 Saturday morning, and spent Saturday morning in
9 the office. Got there about 8:30 a.m., I would
10 say.

11 Q Okay. You got into the offices 8:30
12 a.m. on --

13 A This would be --

14 Q -- Saturday morning?

15 A -- Saturday morning, the 17th.

16 Q Okay. What did you do then?

17 A Let's see. It was 8:30 then. It was
18 still much too early to call Mr. Magruder, so I
19 went to my office and started to clean house,
20 so to speak, get rid of anything that was
21 possibly incriminating, by using the shredders.

22 And Mr. Powell was in there, who had

1 been -- he was a press person. And I figured
2 he had better -- he better know about this
3 because, you know, there is going to be press
4 inquiries and what have you. So I spoke to
5 him. And I needed to get ahold of -- still
6 needed to get ahold of Magruder.

7 Q Why did you need to get ahold of
8 Mr. Magruder?

9 A Because Mr. Powell told me there was
10 a press conference that was scheduled for the
11 attorney general, for Mr. Mitchell, who was out
12 in California with Mr. Magruder, at noon
13 California time. And I figured that they would
14 be -- you know, without knowing about this,
15 they could be blindsided by the press.

16 So I went over to -- I used my pass
17 to go over the to the White House, and I called
18 Magruder at what would have been an appropriate
19 hour, I guess about 8:00 his time. Using the
20 phone in the situation room, and I told him
21 that he should get to a secure phone. And I
22 said, "There is a missile base nearby where you

1 are. Go there and use the KYX," which is the
2 scrambler.

3 He didn't want to do that. He said,
4 "Why? Why do I have to go use," you know, all
5 this stuff. And I said, you know, "I wouldn't
6 be asking to you do it if there weren't a damn
7 good reason why. Go to a secure phone and call
8 me back."

9 And so at any rate, I waited a bit
10 and he called me back, and I said, "Are you on
11 a secure phone?" He said yes, but I doubted
12 it. But at any rate I had to tell him. So I
13 told him what had happened and I said that I
14 had used McCord. And boy, he was upset, as he
15 had every right to be.

16 But I said, "Look, never mind that
17 now. Get to John Mitchell, tell him what has
18 happened because you've got this press
19 conference coming up, so they can decide what
20 do. Go do it now."

21 So we hung up, I went back over to
22 1701, committee headquarters, and went back up

1 to Mr. Powell's office. And in conversation
2 with Mr. Powell the phone rang, and it was
3 Magruder. And Magruder said that Mr. Mitchell
4 had said, given instructions that I was to find
5 Dick Kleindienst, who was then the attorney
6 general who succeeded Mr. Mitchell.

7 And I was to tell him that he was to
8 get McCord, who was the guy who could link us
9 to the -- see, everybody else was under alias,
10 and the idea was they could leave and they
11 would never be found. They would just
12 disappear into the Cuban community. They
13 weren't known under their correct names, but
14 McCord could be linked. He said, "Get McCord
15 out, tell him that John wants him to do it. It
16 is a message from John."

17 And Powell, gee, he was shaking his
18 head. He didn't think that was a good idea. I
19 didn't think it was a good idea. I didn't see
20 how he could do it anyway, but a command from
21 Mr. Mitchell was not to be ignored. I didn't
22 know where Mr. Kleindienst was.

1 Q Let me ask you a question. What time
2 approximately on Saturday did this call come in
3 from Magruder?

4 A This was before noon. Before noon
5 Eastern time, where we were.

6 Q Then what did you do?

7 A Well, had to find Kleindienst, and
8 Mr. Powell used to work for Mr. Kleindienst.
9 So Mr. Powell found Kleindienst, Kleindienst
10 was at the Burning Tree Country Club playing
11 golf. I had never been there, and Powell Moore
12 had. And so, rather than him give me
13 instructions which I might get lost, this, that
14 and the other thing, he agreed to drive me in
15 his Volkswagen out there.

16 And we got out there just a little
17 after noon, and the fellow in charge of golf
18 said that they had already made the turn to
19 come in, and they were in having lunch. So I
20 went in and sure enough, there was
21 Mr. Kleindienst having lunch with some other
22 people.

1 And I sort of gave him the high sign,
2 and he recognized me and he recognized the high
3 sign. And he got up, and I told him we had to
4 speak with him privately right away, and he
5 said, "Okay, come back here." And we went back
6 in a locker area.

7 And I told him to -- the entry. He
8 had heard about the entry. I said, "Well,
9 those were my people, and it is my fault, and I
10 take full responsibility. But I have been sent
11 here with a message from Mr. Mitchell, that
12 Mr. Mitchell wants you to get Mr. McCord out of
13 jail. I don't know how you can do that." And
14 Powell Moore is shaking his head, and of course
15 he was right, it was not a good idea.

16 And I said, "I don't know what would
17 happen to you if you were to try a thing like
18 that," and Mr. Kleindienst said, "Happen to
19 me?" He said, "Fuck what happens to me. What
20 happens to the President if I do a damn fool
21 thing like that?" He was really angry. And he
22 said, "I am not going do that."

1 And he said, "And John Mitchell knows
2 me well enough that if he wants to send a
3 message like that to me he can send it himself.
4 He doesn't have to send it through you." And
5 he said, "You go back and talk to Magruder or
6 whoever sent you here, and tell him that I said
7 if John Mitchell has a message for me, he
8 should call me himself. He is not going to do
9 it." And that was the end of that
10 conversation, and Powell Moore and I got out of
11 there.

12 Q All right. What happened the rest of
13 the day?

14 A Well, I went back and continued
15 trying to shred. Now, the shredder that I was
16 using was the kind that is approved for
17 classified documents. And it is very slow,
18 small and slow. And I was getting rid of
19 everything I could. And I needed a bigger
20 shredder.

21 And I think I saw Mr. Odle, and there
22 was another shredder, a big shredder up on a

1 different floor. He showed that to me and he
2 showed me how to operate it. And I used it.

3 Q Why are you shredding documents now?

4 A Because I anticipated that there
5 would be, you know, there is McCord, right.
6 And there was going to be an investigation, and
7 I didn't want somebody coming in with a search
8 warrant finding anything that was
9 incriminating. That's why God created
10 shredders.

11 Q Okay. Thank you.

12 All right, the rest of the weekend,
13 Saturday and Sunday, what did you do? If you
14 recall?

15 A I don't know what I did on Sunday.

16 Q Well, then, let's get to Monday.

17 A Well, Monday I came to work as usual.
18 And there was a message that John Dean wanted
19 to see me, and I was pleased by that.

20 Q Why?

21 A Well, because now I figured, okay,
22 the powers that be have got a grip on things.

1 I mean, they are aware of the situation,
2 decisions have been taken, I am going to get
3 instructions and so forth. And I went over to
4 the White House, I'd say right around 11:00.

5 And I found that Mr. Dean was already
6 out in the hall by his office. He was waiting
7 for me, and he very quickly said, you know,
8 "Let's get out of here, let's go for a walk."
9 And it was quite clear to me, at least it was
10 my perception, that he did not want to be seen
11 with me. And I thought that was very
12 reasonable in view of the situation.

13 And so we went out and walked south
14 on 17th Street along the side of the Old
15 Executive Office Building, which housed its
16 offices, and there were a lot of people on the
17 sidewalk. And we didn't talk about anything
18 substantive until we got across the street and
19 got into the park and sat down on a bench
20 there.

21 And I had had -- I was wearing
22 contact lenses at the time, and I got a mote of

1 dust in my eye and I made a little movement the
2 way you do, and he said, "Are you all right,"
3 or something like that. I said, "No, I have
4 this dust in my eye. I wear contact lenses."
5 He said, "Oh, you do? So do I." Which didn't
6 surprise me, because Dean did not -- his
7 appearance was not the same as your typical
8 White House staffer. Dean did not look at all
9 in his appearance the way the photographs show
10 he looked in his appearance before the
11 Congress. He was wearing contact lenses, not
12 those owlish glasses that he wore in the
13 photographs. Rather than having his hair
14 cropped short and sort of dark, it was kind of
15 a bleached blond, the way you would get if you
16 spent a lot of time in the pool, the chlorine
17 in it and the sun. It was long, hung over his
18 collar in the back, down shaggly over his ears.
19 Kind of looked like a youthful ferret.

20 And at any rate, I started right up
21 by saying, "Look, I was the captain of the
22 aircraft carrier when it hit the reef. This is

1 my responsibility. You remember the job you
2 recruited me for? Well, by the time we finally
3 got a decision, the thing was down to a quarter
4 of a million, in -- and that was it. And those
5 were my people. And I shouldn't have used
6 McCord, but I did."

7 And he cut me off, and he said,
8 "Listen," he said, "there is one thing I've got
9 to know right away. Did anybody in the White
10 House -- are they aware of what you were doing,
11 that you were going in there?" And I said,
12 "Well, Mr. Strachan certainly knew that I was
13 going back in, but I don't know that he knew
14 when I was going back in."

15 And then I tried again to lay the
16 whole thing out for him, and he cut me off
17 again and he said, "What about Colson? Did
18 Colson know?" And I said, "Not unless Howard
19 Hunt told him, and I have no reason to believe
20 that Howard Hunt would have told him. I don't
21 think Colson knew." And he seemed kind of
22 relieved that Colson didn't know.

1 I said, "Look, if you are worried
2 about who sent us into the Watergate, it is not
3 somebody over in the White House. It was
4 Magruder. Magruder was pushing for this
5 thing."

6 And so then, again, I started trying
7 to lay the thing out. I said, "Are you the
8 damage control action officer?" As a matter of
9 fact, I think that's probably the first thing I
10 said to him: "Are you the damage control
11 action officer?" And he said, "Well, I guess
12 kind of, yes I am." I said, "Well, I need to
13 know because it is important, you know if you
14 are the damage control action officer, you get
15 to know certain things."

16 Q What does that mean, "damage
17 control" --

18 A Well, in clandestine terms when you
19 have a -- it is just like on a ship, if there
20 has been damage you have got an officer who is
21 damage control officer. He has to assess what
22 the damage is, he has to issue the orders

1 necessary to have the repairs made to minimize
2 the damage and pump the thing out again,
3 et cetera. And it is that sort of a metaphor,
4 if you will.

5 Q Now did you -- I'm sorry. Did you
6 tell Dean anything about the Fielding entry?

7 A No, wait a minute. You are getting
8 ahead of me here.

9 So when he said he was the damage
10 control action officer, I told him that, "Well,
11 look, these guys are not going to talk; they
12 are professionals. But you need to know the
13 worst case scenario should one of them talk."

14 And it was at that point that I told
15 him about the Fielding entry. And he expressed
16 a great surprise at the Fielding entry.

17 And I was concerned, of course, about
18 the men, and I said, "You know, the D.C. jail
19 is reputed at this time of year, summer, to be
20 a hellhole. We have got to get these guys out
21 of there. They expect -- they expect that."
22 And he said, like, "What do they expect? What

1 are you talking about?" I said, "Well, the
2 usual thing in a situation like this, which is
3 bail, attorneys fees, and the family support."
4 And I said they expect that support, and he
5 said, "What kind of support?"

6 And he said, "Well, everybody will be
7 taken care of." He said, "That's a given.
8 Everybody is going to be taken care of."

9 It occurred to me that given what was
10 in my head, and that I had just reported to the
11 President's counsel who would presumably report
12 to his client, the President of the United
13 States, you know, this disaster, and what was
14 in my head. And that, although I certainly
15 would never do so, that I could, if I wanted
16 to, bring down the President.

17 That despite my assurances that I
18 would not do that, the stakes were so high that
19 they might want to take me out, and I did not
20 know of any other individual who was capable of
21 doing that in a clean and workmanlike manner
22 other than myself. I didn't want some amateur,

1 some Sunday morning sticking a shotgun through
2 the kitchen window, that he takes out only not
3 only me but my wife and children. So I said,
4 "Look, if you want me to go -- if you want to
5 go stand on a street corner while somebody
6 shoots me, just let me know what street corner
7 and I will stand on it."

8 He said, "I don't think we have
9 gotten there yet," and that kind of shook him
10 up a little bit. Maybe he hadn't realized the
11 enormity of what he had wrought, so to speak,
12 and what I had wrought by making the error I
13 did of using McCord.

14 And I said, "Look, if you are the
15 damage control action officer, you are going to
16 have to keep ahead of this investigation." And
17 I proceeded to instruct him as to how to do
18 that with the FBI, which of course would be the
19 lead agency on the investigation.

20 And I explained to him that years
21 ago, during the espionage trial of one Judith
22 Coplon, who had been a Department of Justice

1 employee, they -- "they" being the government,
2 had been required to turn over to the defense
3 the FBI reports, and that the FBI was quite
4 upset by that. And so they had at first
5 started separating the narrative report from
6 the leads. They used administrative page and
7 everything. And then the defense lawyers got
8 on to that, and so finally it had come down to
9 where -- the way they did it was every time
10 there was an interview with somebody, or an
11 agent did something, it was put in something
12 called a form FD 302. And they were all
13 separate forms.

14 And he needed to get -- not wait for
15 the reports, because that would put him behind
16 the power curve on that. What he needed to do
17 was get the FD 302s. As soon as they were
18 generated, he needed to get those.

19 But then to find out what the FBI was
20 doing, the FD 302 showed him what they did.
21 But to look at what they were doing, where they
22 were going, how they were thinking, he needed

1 to get the leads. The leads were set out in
2 something called an Airtel, a blue sheet,
3 A-i-r-t-e-l. I said, "You get the FD 302s and
4 get the Airtel," I said, "you can keep on top
5 of this thing." And he thanked me for that
6 information.

7 Now by this time we are walking back.
8 And he said, "By the way, you know, where is
9 Howard Hunt these days?" And I said, "Well, he
10 is lying low. The reporters are after him."
11 And he said, well, he said, "For that reason
12 and for -- because of what you have been
13 telling me," he said, "I think it would be
14 better if he were to leave the country for a
15 while." And I said, "Well, it just so happens
16 that his family is in Europe, and he could very
17 easily and reasonably go join them, I don't
18 think anybody would think anything of that."

19 He said, "Well, have him do that,
20 have him do that." And he said, you know, "Do
21 it right away." So I said, "All right. I
22 don't know how soon I can get ahold of him, but

1 I will try to do that."

2 And we went up and we then got to the
3 corner there, you know, catercorner across from
4 1701. He shook hands and I said, "I'm sorry,"
5 and he said, "Yes, it sure is a mess." And
6 shook hands and he went back.

7 He said, "By the way, I don't think I
8 should talk to you any more," which surprised
9 me so much because he is the action control --
10 damage control action officer, and now he is
11 not going to talk to me any more. So I said,
12 "Well, then, you are going to have a new damage
13 control action officer." And he said, "Yes,
14 that's right."

15 And I said, "Well, who is it going to
16 be?" And he said, "Well, it will be somewhere
17 over there at 1701," meaning over at the
18 committee. "Well, how am I going to know it?"
19 And he said, "He will make himself known to
20 you." I said, "All right."

21 So I went over and I right away tried
22 to get ahold of Hunt, and I located Hunt. Hunt

1 was in his office. I guess he was in his
2 office. At any rate, I told him to go out and
3 to walk I guess that would be west on
4 Pennsylvania Avenue, and come to 18th Street
5 and turn south, and I'd catch up with him.
6 What I wanted to do was countersurveil, make
7 sure he wasn't being tailed by a reporter or by
8 the FBI.

9 So I went across the street, got a
10 newspaper, and I am sitting there watching.
11 Sure enough, here came Hunt, and he seemed to
12 be clean. So I joined him and I told him that
13 it was desired that he leave the country, join
14 his family, and he didn't want to do that. He
15 said, "Oh, he said that Magruder." I said,
16 "No, no, no. This didn't come from Magruder."
17 I said, "This came from across the street,"
18 meaning the White House.

19 Well, that reassured him. He said,
20 "Well, maybe now we are getting someplace."
21 And he said, well, could he use the \$1500 that
22 he had still left, and I said yes. I mean, we

1 were sending him out; it should be at our
2 expense, not his. So off he went, and I went
3 back to work at 1701.

4 Q Now, can you tell me about what time
5 it was that you met with Howard Hunt on that
6 Monday?

7 A I would say, let me see. I broke up
8 with Dean at about noon. It was about
9 somewhere between, let's say, 12:15 and 12:30
10 in there. I mean, it took a little while for
11 me to have that conversation with him. I guess
12 I went back in there around 12:30.

13 Q About how long did your conversation
14 with Hunt last?

15 A About 15 minutes, at the most.

16 Q And can you estimate about how long
17 it was between the time that you called Howard
18 Hunt and you actually met up with him on the
19 street?

20 A Well, as I said, I got back to work
21 maybe 12:05 or something of that sort, and the
22 first thing I did, because Dean had emphasized

1 he wants this right away, was to call Howard.
2 And I guess another five minutes or so,
3 let's say around quarter of -- quarter after, I
4 had given him the instructions.

5 Then I had left immediately to go out
6 so I could countersurveil, and what would it
7 take him? Another five minutes or so, I guess,
8 I don't know. So I would say that we certainly
9 were meeting and talking by 12:20, 12:25. And
10 I had this conversation with him that I just
11 talked to you about, maybe 10 minutes. And
12 then I just went back across the street and
13 went back to work.

14 Q All right. What happened next?

15 A Well, next was I got a telephone call
16 from John Dean, and he said, "Gordon," he said,
17 "you know about that conversation we had about
18 Howard Hunt?" I said, "Yes." He said, "Cancel
19 that." And I looked at my watch and it had
20 been like 40 minutes before. So that would
21 have put it oh, we are talking probably maybe a
22 little after 1:00 now, that we are having this

1 conversation.

2 And I said, "Well, I don't know if I
3 can, you know. I gave the -- you told me to do
4 it right away. I gave the instructions, and I
5 may not be able to reach him. He may be en
6 route." And he said, "Well, Ehrlichman says
7 that he shouldn't go. Cancel it." I said,
8 "Well, I will do my best."

9 And I was able to reach Hunt, and he
10 was at home. And said, "Do you want to
11 cancel?" And that upset Hunt, it really upset
12 Hunt. He said, "Oh, my god, a 180 on a thing
13 like leaving the country, you know, in 45
14 minutes." He said, "This is bad."

15 And he -- he wouldn't agree, really,
16 to the cancelling. What he said was, he said,
17 "Look, I've got business in New York. So I am
18 going to go up to New York, and from New York I
19 can go anywhere." He said, "I can go overseas;
20 I can go domestically." And he said, "I am
21 going to go up to New York and I will get back
22 to you."

1 And one thing he said that he did
2 want, he said, "Make it one of your number one
3 priorities, I am going to need a lawyer." And
4 I said okay, and that was that.

5 MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. All right,
6 let's go off the record for a couple of
7 minutes.

8 VIDEOGRAPHER: Off record at 4:54
9 p.m.

10 (Discussion off the record)

11 VIDEOGRAPHER: On the record 5:04
12 p.m.

13 BY MR. WILLIAMS:

14 Q Mr. Liddy, I wanted to go back and
15 clarify certain events in June, early June of
16 1972, with respect to your meetings with
17 Magruder where there was discussion as to a
18 potential reentry into the DNC.

19 Now, do you recall how many meetings
20 you had with Magruder with respect to
21 reentering the DNC?

22 A There were two.

1 Q Okay. What was the date of the first
2 one?

3 A The first one would have been I think
4 the 9th of June. And you know, there was the
5 discussion, which was, of course, warranted,
6 about the relative uselessness of the -- of the
7 material, the lack of value of it. And I gave
8 him the same story that McCord had given me,
9 which was that the room monitoring device
10 failed or was being absorbed and so forth by
11 the steel beam.

12 And he said, "Well, can you fix it?"
13 And I said, "Yes, we could, and we could go
14 back in on a shoestring basis, just McCord and
15 the key man to get him in, and then somebody to
16 guard them." And I said, "I would do it
17 without paying McCord, because it is McCord's
18 failure. So yes, we can have a quick
19 in-and-out fix-it mission."

20 And he said, "Well, do that." So I
21 made ready to do that, and then a few days
22 later, on the 12th, he called me in again, and

1 that's when we had the big -- the big slam with
2 the hand on the desk. "This is what I want to
3 know right here," and so forth, and the
4 discussion about the files. Can you open them,
5 they are locked, yes; can you open them, yes;
6 and told me to bring up all the Cuban cohort
7 armed with all the cameras that they could
8 carry and the film and everything, because what
9 he wanted was a complete photo recon mission.

10 Well, what had happened was from
11 the -- for some reason, from the 9th to the
12 12th, this quick little three-man in-and-out
13 repair the room monitoring device mission had
14 metamorphosed into this gigantic photo recon op
15 in which they will be there hours, exposed all
16 this time, very vulnerable, you know. I was
17 flabbergasted, but that's what he wanted. And
18 so, "Okay, that's what you want, that's what we
19 will do."

20 Q All right. And then three days
21 later, am I correct in understanding you met
22 with Mitchell?

1 A Yes. That's when I went down and put
2 the envelope that I have described
3 previously -- which was just the outer one was
4 just plain, you couldn't tell what it was -- on
5 the corner of his desk. And it just stayed
6 there. I left the room and I never saw him
7 touch it, much less pick it up.

8 Q And was there anything revealed in
9 those logs that would have indicated that there
10 was a bugging activity going on in the DNC
11 headquarters?

12 A No. You have to understand how
13 that's handled in the FBI, and that was my
14 training. At first what they would do, any
15 time they had a source that they wanted to
16 conceal, and you always concealed the source,
17 anybody who didn't have a need to know. And
18 the consumer of the product doesn't have a need
19 to know the source. You characterize the
20 source as being reliable, unreliable, what have
21 you.

22 But first they would say T-1, and

1 then if you had more than one source, it would
2 T-1 says this, T-2 says that, or this is the
3 information.

4 Then the FBI got a little more
5 sophisticated about it, and they would indicate
6 the office, the field division, by which --
7 like Denver would be DN then a number. And
8 then if it were a criminal informant, C; and if
9 it was security informant, S. Chicago would be
10 CG, Indianapolis would be IP.

11 So what I did was I just put a little
12 code in there like that, that said T-1 or
13 whatever gives this information, and it is
14 highly reliable. Usually you can tell, if you
15 are in the FBI and someone puts a high
16 reliability on something, that usually means
17 that a wire. Or that's a bag job.

18 Q All right. Thank you.

19 Now, let's go back to the Monday
20 after the break-in. You had one meeting with
21 John Dean and one telephone call with him; is
22 that -- let me strike that. You met with John

1 Dean sometime around 11:00 in the walk in the
2 park; is that right?

3 A I was told that they had received a
4 message in my absence from John Dean wants to
5 see me.

6 Q And then after the walk in the park
7 you had a telephone conversation with Dean?

8 A Yes. He called me.

9 Q And after that telephone
10 conversation, did you have any other contact
11 with him that day, that you recall?

12 A On the 19th?

13 Q Yes, on the 19th.

14 A He called me, he told me to cancel --
15 to cancel the going out of the country of --

16 Q Okay. After that conversation, did
17 you have any further conversations, say the
18 next period of two weeks, with Mr. Dean?

19 A Let me see. Dean, Dean, Dean, Dean,
20 Dean. I had a conversation with Dean two days
21 before my trial.

22 Q Okay. Now when was your trial?

1 A My trial started I think it was
2 the -- Monday, the 8th of January of '73.

3 Q All right.

4 A And I got a call from Dean at my
5 home, on I guess Saturday night or -- I think
6 around the 6th. Around the 6th.

7 Q Okay. Now, between June 19 and
8 January -- June 19, 1972, and January 6, or
9 thereabouts, 1973, do you recall any direct
10 contact you had with John Dean?

11 A Direct contact with John Dean then,
12 no. I don't recall. My subsequent ones was
13 like -- the one I just told you about, and then
14 there was --

15 Q Let's go to the one you just told me
16 about. This is right before your trial; right?

17 A Right before my trial.

18 Q Tell me about that conversation.

19 A Well, the phone rang. I picked up
20 the phone, and the voice said, "Gordon, I think
21 you will recognize my voice," and yes, I did.
22 I said, "Yes, I do." It was Dean. It was

1 unmistakably Dean.

2 And what he did was, he very
3 carefully and methodically repeated, with
4 respect to me, what the commitments that he had
5 made with respect -- back in my walk in the
6 park with him -- with respect to the fellows
7 who were in jail. He said, "Listen, I want you
8 to know that you are going to receive \$30,000
9 annually," which was my salary. In other
10 words, they would continue my salary in family
11 support.

12 He said, "You will be pardoned within
13 two years." He said, "You will have your
14 attorneys fees paid," and he said, "We will see
15 to it that you go to the Danbury, Connecticut
16 federal prison." And I said to him, "Do you
17 know the difference between a pardon and a
18 commutation?" And he said, "Yes, I do know the
19 difference, and it is pardon." And I said,
20 "Well" --

21 Q Why was that significant?

22 A Well, because a pardon restores all

1 your civil rights and sort of wipes the slate
2 clean, whereas a commutation simply lessens
3 your sentence. And you come out, you still
4 have all the disabilities that any ex-convict
5 has. It is a very significant difference.

6 Q Right.

7 A And then I said, "Now, look. If
8 circumstances change and what have you, and it
9 gets tough, and you are faced with a choice of
10 either paying the support to my family or my
11 attorneys fees, pay my attorney. He is my
12 friend and, you know, I wouldn't do that to
13 him. So you pay him."

14 And I said, "Lastly, I want to you
15 make sure that everybody there knows that there
16 is no quid pro quo here. I intend to remain
17 silent no matter what. And now this is
18 necessary. It is all very nice, but it is
19 necessary. No quid pro quo." And he said he
20 understood; he would do that. And I said,
21 "Fine. Well then, you tell them to watch. I
22 will show them how to die." And that was the

1 end of the conversation.

2 Now I immediately picked up a
3 felt-tip pin that was lying on the nightstand,
4 and there was a small oblong piece of paper,
5 and I wrote down those four commitments in the
6 felt-tip pen. And then, when I went Monday
7 morning to the trial, I guess it was Monday
8 morning, I showed it to Peter Maroulis, my
9 attorney. And he asked me, "Where does this
10 come from?" And I related just what I related
11 to you, and he said, "Well, you ought to make a
12 notation on that and preserve it."

13 So I then took a pen and I wrote
14 down, "Dean to me," and such and such. And I
15 gave it to Peter. So far as I know he's got it
16 still.

17 Q I think I have a copy of that, which
18 has been marked as Exhibit No. 654 (sic). Can
19 you take a look at least what is on the
20 right-hand column of that document and tell me
21 if that is indeed a copy of the notation?

22 A This appears to be a xerographic copy

1 of that piece of paper that I wrote that thing
2 on, 1, 2, 3, 4. And then there is in my
3 handwriting, see that -- the other one is
4 printed in my handwriting, but then down in my
5 script, such as it is, is "Dean by phone to me
6 at home."

7 Q Why don't you show it to the camera?

8 A I am showing it now to the camera,
9 and I am pointing with my left index finger at
10 the correct thing on the paper, because there
11 is more than one document reproduced on this
12 piece of paper.

13 MR. WILLIAMS: All right. And John
14 Garrick, for the record, this is obviously a
15 document that has been produced in discovery,
16 and this particular one bears the Bates stamp
17 L501. All right?

18 MR. GARRICK: Right.

19 BY MR. WILLIAMS:

20 Q Okay. And can you just read what's
21 on the page, please, Mr. Liddy?

22 A All right. There is the number one,

1 period, "Living expenses, \$30,000 per annum."
2 Under that it says, "Number 2, period, pardon
3 within two years." Under that is "number 3,
4 period, Danbury prison," and under that is 4,
5 with no period, "legal fees."

6 And then down there in my
7 handwriting, the script, if you will, "Dean by
8 phone to me, at home."

9 And there is also some little things
10 like "H plus D" and "U D phone" and "H D U plus
11 O." I am not sure what they mean. There is
12 that "H D" again, "H plus D, H plus D." And I
13 think that's the -- I think that's the
14 handwriting of Peter Maroulis, I am not sure.
15 It is too small a sample to tell, and it is
16 small, it is minuscule.

17 Q All right. Well, let's move on.

18 After that telephone conversation,
19 did you have any further contact with John
20 Dean?

21 A Yes. Let's see.

22 Q And I am talking about direct

1 contact, personal --

2 A Direct personal contact. I recall
3 once when I was in prison, you know, from time
4 to time they would change the Watergate special
5 prosecutor. And the new guy would come in, and
6 everybody would tell him Liddy won't talk. But
7 they all -- and I understand this, they all
8 felt that they at least had to try to talk me
9 into becoming a rat snitch like Dean.

10 And so they would have me taken from
11 wherever I was incarcerated at the time, and
12 brought down to, you know, snitch central which
13 would be the Watergate prosecutor's office, and
14 they would make their pitch. I would tell them
15 no, and then I would go back and I would not be
16 bothered until they would have yet another new
17 prosecutor.

18 Well, on one occasion, and I forget
19 who the new prosecutor was, to be honest with
20 you at this point, I don't know who he was.
21 But they brought me down to the offices that
22 they occupied, and he wasn't ready to receive

1 me, you know, his lordship. And so they said,
2 "Well, just go in there. There is an empty
3 office in there. Go in there."

4 So I went in, and nobody guarding me
5 or anything else, I am wandering around. I
6 could have stolen the plans to the Bismarck or
7 something while I was there. At any rate, I
8 walk into this office and much to my surprise,
9 there across the room, sitting behind a desk
10 doing his snatch act, is that little fucker
11 John Dean.

12 And you know, I looked at him, and he
13 looked at me, and he is looking at me like a
14 rabbit looking at a cobra. And I said to
15 myself, "Jesus Christ, why are they doing this?
16 Why are they putting me alone, nobody else
17 around, with John Dean? I wonder if they want
18 me to whack the son of a bitch."

19 And I saw that on the -- right on the
20 desk there were these pencils, and I could have
21 put it right up under his chin, directly into
22 the -- through the soft pallet and into the

1 base of his brain, and it would have been all
2 over. And it occurred to me, well, to what
3 end? It is all over, you know. It has already
4 happened. The worst has occurred; there is no
5 point to this. This is not some sophisticated
6 plan to have me whack John Dean. This is what
7 we used to call in the service a "cluster
8 fuck."

9 And so that was that. I mean I --
10 Dean just jumped up and just ran out of there,
11 you know, like the bunny rabbit he is. Boing,
12 boing, boing, and he is gone. And I just sat
13 down and I waited for the sons of bitches to
14 come in and make their pitch, and they made
15 their pitch and I went home.

16 Q After that meeting -- I shouldn't
17 call it a meeting. After that encounter with
18 Mr. Dean, did you have any further contact with
19 him?

20 A He -- it wasn't direct, of course. I
21 mean, I was in prison. And he contacted my
22 attorney Peter Maroulis, and he actually wanted

1 me to give him a written statement saying that
2 he didn't know anything about Watergate or
3 something like that, you know, beforehand. And
4 of course I refused because it wouldn't have
5 been true.

6 Q Thank you. Now, do you know if that
7 contact through Mr. Maroulis was before or
8 after the incident when you were brought down
9 to meet with the special prosecutor?

10 A I don't remember whether it was
11 before or after. I really don't.

12 Q Okay. And subsequent to the
13 discussions we have had and until this lawsuit
14 began, have you had any further contacts with
15 John Dean?

16 A Dean, Dean, Dean, Dean, Dean. No, I
17 don't recall any. No.

18 MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. John, I think I
19 am just about done. Why don't we go off the
20 record for a couple of minutes.

21 VIDEOGRAPHER: Going off record at
22 5:22.

1 (Discussion off the record)

2 VIDEOGRAPHER: I am back on record.

3 MR. WILLIAMS: While we were off the
4 record, it was decided that we will suspend the
5 deposition at this point and pick it up
6 tomorrow morning. Is that acceptable,
7 Mr. Garrick?

8 MR. GARRICK: Yes, it is. You want
9 to settle on a time tomorrow morning now or --

10 MR. WILLIAMS: Why don't we go off
11 the record now? All right, I think we are all
12 agreed, anyway, it is 9:00.

13 MR. GARRICK: That's fine.

14 MR. WILLIAMS: That's 9:00 our time.

15 MR. GARRICK: Right.

16 MR. WILLIAMS: And Mr. Dorsen will be
17 here, I take it?

18 MR. GARRICK: Will be there in
19 person, right.

20 MR. WILLIAMS: Great. Thank you very
21 much, and we will go off the record.

22 VIDEOGRAPHER: 5:24 and we are off

1 the record.

2 (Liddy Deposition Exhibit
3 No. 655 was marked for
4 identification.)

5 (Whereupon, at 5:24 p.m. the
6 deposition of G. GORDON LIDDY
7 was adjourned.)

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